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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines how public support for bilateral foreign aid in democratic
donor countries, namely the United States and South Korea, is influenced by various
methods of policy framing. Despite the benefits of bilateral aid to both donor and
recipient countries, public support for distributing it has been on the decline due to fears
that aid is ineffective. However, this trend may also be the product of the publics’
perceptions of where aid is going and for what purpose. To determine the effects of type
of aid and perceptions of recipient countries on support for foreign aid, I conducted a
public opinion survey distributed by Amazon mTurk with 1035 respondents in the United
States in June 2020. To further examine if the U.S. public prefers different types of aid to
be distributed to certain types of countries or regimes, I conducted another public opinion
survey in July 2021 distributed by Qualtrics with 625 respondents being obtained through
quota sampling. Finally, to examine the effect of policy information, in this case on
support for aid to North Korea, I conducted a public opinion survey in South Korea in
September 2020 distributed by Macromill Embrain with 1200 respondents. A comparison
of these findings suggests that public support for aid among democratic donor countries
is sensitive to policy framing, although the efficacy of certain framing methods may be
highly dependent upon the social and political context in which aid is being considered.
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INTRODUCTION
Bilateral foreign aid1 plays a significant role in the development of both donor
and recipient countries. Official Development Assistance (ODA) is positively associated
with growth in human development indicators (Kar 2016; Mohamed & Mzee 2017) and
negatively associated with poverty and infant mortality rates (Masud & Yontcheva 2005;
Boone 1996). Foreign aid has the potential to promote significant economic growth and
reform in recipient countries (Bearce & Tirone 2010; Headey 2008); While recipient
countries utilize aid for humanitarian and institutional purposes, donor countries can also
use aid to conduct strategic foreign policy (Paxton & Knack 2011).
Not only can donor countries explicitly place conditions on aid contributions, but
also a norm of reciprocity, typically by means of regulated state behavior, is expected out
of a recipient country. Reciprocity is encouraged through democratic mechanisms within
donor countries. For instance, aid donors, though inadvertently through the votes of selfserving electorates, selectively punish human rights violators through aid cuts (Heinrich
et. al 2018). Despite these benefits, public support for aid has been declining in donor
countries out of concerns that aid is ineffective (Norris 2017). However, lowered support
for aid may also indicate a discrepancy between public opinion and the goals of
policymakers. Thus, the observed pattern in public opinion may not result from the
concept of aid itself, but rather from where the aid is going.

1

In the context of this paper “foreign aid” will refer to a combination of bilateral
humanitarian, economic or developmental, and military aid that is provided by one donor
country to one recipient country unless stated otherwise. It is also used interchangeably
with “foreign assistance” and “ODA.”
1

Nonetheless, states are influenced by the public in determining the quantity and
quality of foreign aid contributions (Mosley 1985). It is thus important to examine the
role of public support for foreign aid policy, including where the public prefers aid to be
delivered, as many donor countries are democratic and reflect public opinion through
policymaking. This thesis examines the effects of policy framing in various contexts, at
first through individual-level analysis of public opinion surveys in the United States and
South Korea, and then more broadly through a cross-national lens. This type of analysis
is beneficial for a couple of reasons. The first is that it accounts for inherent differences
in demographics and prominent political issues and attitudes between different countries.
Second, it allows for comparison of how policy framing impacts support or preferences
for aid in different political contexts, as well as comparison of individual-level factors
that may predict support or behavior.
This analysis is conducted throughout five main chapters. The first chapter is a
literature review that broadly examines determinants of support for bilateral aid in
democratic donor countries and contains subsections of literature specific to public
opinion of aid in the U.S. and South Korea. Next, I include a quantitative chapter
analyzing the effects of policy framing, varying by type of aid and recipient regime being
considered, on support for aid in the United States. This chapter uses data obtained from
an original public opinion survey that was conducted through Amazon mTurk in June
2020. The following quantitative chapter analyzes the effects of policy framing, varying
by type of aid, on public preferences for the types of regimes that should receive aid. This
analysis uses an original public opinion survey, also in the United States, conducted by
Qualtrics in July 2021. The third quantitative chapter analyzes the effects of policy
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framing, varying by information provided on allocative costs, on South Koreans’ support
for providing humanitarian aid to North Korea. The data for this chapter was obtained
from an original public opinion survey conducted in South Korea by Macromill Embrain
in September 2020. The final analytical chapter of this thesis is the conclusion, which
summarizes the main findings of each quantitative chapter and then segues into broader
conclusions drawn from a cross-national comparison of the findings, suggestions for
future research, and policy implications. At the end of the thesis, there is a section for
references, and then an appendix containing tables not included in the second quantitative
chapter.
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LITERATURE REVIEW: BROAD OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN AID
DETERMINANTS
Who Donates the Most Foreign Aid?
Members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) form the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which sets objectives for
ODA provided by developed states. Bilateral foreign aid constitutes over 60% of the
committee’s foreign aid donations overall. Not only does the DAC provide most of the
world’s bilateral foreign aid, but the developed democracies within it provide the most
out of the 30 member states (OECD 2021; Ilasco 2020). The most recent statistics on
bilateral aid flows, reporting FY2020, indicate that the largest volume donors of foreign
aid were developed democracies: The United States was the largest contributor of ODA
followed by European Union (EU) institutions, Japan, and the United Kingdom (OECD
2021). Nonetheless, because a majority of the world’s foreign aid consists of ODA that is
mostly provided by developed democracies, this analysis of public opinion will be
restricted to such countries, in which public opinion is readily available, in the context of
bilateral aid.
Framing of Foreign Aid Policy
One of the main topics of examination in this area surrounds how the framing of
foreign aid policy by political elites and the media shifts public support. There are a
variety of ways in which policy can be framed including specifying the purpose of aid,
perceptions of aid costs, relating aid donations to domestic affairs, and emphasizing
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moral obligations. Before discussing the literature that expands on the effects of such
policy framing, it is important to determine whether this topic is worth examining at all.
For his analysis of European public opinion on aid to Africa, Rye Olsen (2001)
argues that it is essential to understand public opinion of foreign aid as being top-down
rather than bottom-up. In other words, decision-making on where foreign assistance is
delivered is centralized and mainly dictated by general public attitudes, not explicit
expressions from the public of how much aid should be disbursed and where.
Moreover, Rye Olsen (2001) states that general humanitarian attitudes and a
widespread public belief that generally supports “helping the poor” allows European
political elites to give aid to poor African states in a manner that is still consistent with
public opinion. In demonstrating a different top-down decision-making model, Japan’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains that it is necessary to foster broad public consensus
to achieve its international aid goals and actively educates constituents on foreign aid
policy (2003). On the other hand, Mosley agrees that public opinion of foreign aid can be
determined by policy framing in DAC countries, but also concludes that public opinion
works bottom-up and invokes changes in the quantity and quality of aid distributions
(1985). Overall, one cannot conclude that public opinion of aid is either top-down or
bottom-up, but rather that elements of both theories shape it. Nonetheless, it is essential
to examine top-down decision making particularly as it pertains to policy framing. Public
opinion on foreign aid that works in a bottom-up manner will be discussed later in this
analysis.

5

Type of Aid
One manner in which government officials frame aid policy to the public is by
specifying the purpose of aid allocations. Although there seems to be an overarching
theme of favoring humanitarian aid out of altruistic public attitudes, in many countries
this contrasts with preferences to cut the foreign aid budget (Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017;
Aorere 2019; Wood 2018). Furthermore, it is difficult to establish causation for variations
in aid’s purpose on public support; existing literature reports mixed-effects/correlations,
which are not only dependent on a study's unit of analysis and context but also its
methodology (Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017; Aorere 2019; Wood 2018).
In the United States, for instance, a Chicago Council poll found that few
Americans support the idea of increasing economic (10%) and military aid (10%) to other
nations, but when assistance is described in a mission-specific manner, for example as aid
to “promote democracy” or “aid for disaster relief,” support for distributing aid increases
to 56% and 82%, respectively (Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017). It is easy for the authors to
establish a relationship between the variations in aid because there is only one question
that gauges the respondents’ support for six different aid objectives, and the survey also
asks a general question of whether the respondents support increasing either military or
economic aid. Thus, from the results of this survey, one could perhaps also conclude that
Americans are more supportive of aid that goes towards disaster relief than aid that goes
towards promoting democracy abroad. Nonetheless, the broader takeaway is that the
public seems sensitive to the purpose of aid, separate from the amount.
Moreover, a public opinion study conducted in Australia found that Australians
were supportive of humanitarian aid and foreign aid more generally. Even further,
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Australians seemed to be more supportive of humanitarian aid (74%) than aid that
politically and commercially benefitted Australia (13%) (Wood 2018). While variables
that were correlated with general support for Australian aid (including party, gender, and
ideology, all of which will be discussed later in this analysis) failed to explain the
difference in support between these two types of aid, it can be inferred that humanitarian
aid seems less selective and self-serving. Consequently, a causal relationship could not be
established. Sadly, there is not much literature that examines foreign aid policy framing,
in the context of identifying the purpose of aid, outside of the United States.
Perceptions of Costs
Public support for the objectives of aid contrasts with public preferences for
cutting the foreign aid budget. In both the American and Australian studies mentioned
directly above, a large majority of respondents supported cutting the foreign aid budget
rather than cutting spending for domestic programs or increased taxation (Wojtowicz &
Hanania 2017; Wood 2018). This dichotomy is also observed throughout European
countries and the United Kingdom. This phenomenon begs two questions: 1) what causes
this view in public opinion to arise, and 2) how should political elites counter it?
To answer the first question, a majority of the literature seems to suggest that
publics of donor countries are ill-informed on foreign aid policy and drastically
overestimate their costs (Scotto et. al 2017; Klein 2013; Gillens 2001; Ingram 2019;
Wood 2018; Aorere 2019; Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017). The average percentage of
annual GNP allocated to foreign aid, both bilateral and multilateral, by wealthy donor
countries is merely .4% (Ingram 2019), or just around 1% of most federal budgets
(Paxton & Knack 2012). In a study that compared potential European rationales for
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public opinion of foreign aid with potential American rationales, Divens & Constantelos
(2009) found that of the 14 European countries observed, as well as the UK and the U.S.,
an average of only 34.6% of citizens could identify the percentage of the national budget
allocated to aid. Although this trend is widely observed throughout wealthy democracies,
it appears to be more pronounced in the U.S. Of the 14 European countries and the UK,
the average accuracy was 40%, a stark contrast from only 16% of Americans. Not
surprisingly, the percentage of the public that could accurately identify the costs of
foreign aid had a significant, positive effect on public support for bilateral aid distribution
as determined by multiple regression analysis (Divens & Constantelos 2009). This
finding has been confirmed by more recent studies including Klein 2013 and Hurst et. al
2017, which both analyzed public opinion in the United States, and Scotto et. al 2017,
which examined public opinion in both the U.S. and the UK. Understandably, when the
public is not informed on aid policy there is room for misinformation to shape public
opinion.
To begin to answer the second question, many studies have found a relationship
between framing relative costs of aid and public support, but there are mixed results.
Klein (2013) found that 61% of Americans thought that the government spent “too
much” on foreign aid which then decreased to 30% when they were informed that foreign
aid constituted only 1% of the national budget. Following a similar line of questioning,
Hurst et. al (2017) found that when participants in their survey were informed of the same
fact, the percentage of respondents who thought levels of aid were “too big” decreased
from 67% to 28%. Similarly, Scotto et. al (2017) found that presenting the percentage of
costs allocated to foreign aid positively shifted public support in both the U.S. and the
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UK. However, when costs of foreign aid were presented in both monetary and percentage
terms U.S. public support decreased from the baseline form of questioning with no
funding context, but for the UK public support was still higher than the baseline. This
finding suggests that the effect of cost framing is more ambiguous than originally thought
in most theory, and that providing context matters. Perhaps presenting the dollar amount
cancels out the positive effeoffrom presenting aid in terms of a percentage of the federal
budget, or there could be underlying cultural and institutional explanations that drive this
contradiction.
A similar ambiguity is also observed in a South Korean public opinion survey on
bilateral aid to North Korea. While 36% of South Korean respondents supported
expanding humanitarian aid to North Korea without any contextualization, unsurprisingly
that number was only 25% for respondents that were provided with the amount of won
allocated towards that aid. Support was not significantly higher (28%) for respondents
provided with both the amount of won and the percentage of aid in terms of the national
budget despite the comically low percentage that was allocated: less than .1% (Rich &
Puhakka 2020). While there are most likely other factors that can account for the
ambiguity, such as opinions towards North Korea itself, it is still difficult to conjure a
plausible, much less causal, explanation for this finding. The effect of presenting the
amount of won may overshadow the effect of the percentage in this specific context, but
it is difficult to apply this finding anywhere else. Nevertheless, the findings from Rich
and Puhakka and Scotto et. al suggest that this occurrence exists partly because of
different contexts, as in explanations provided in previous sections of this paper, and that
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policy framing in a manner that is completely transparent with costs may simply have an
ambiguous effect.
Preferences for Domestic Issues
The tendency for publics in donor countries to pay attention to domestic affairs
rather than international affairs also explains this paradoxical dichotomy: a public that
supports the idea of foreign assistance but also the idea of cutting the federal budget
allocated to it. More specifically, this occurs in the context of trade-offs.
The dilemma of a tradeoff is exemplified by Wood (2018). Australian survey
participants were informed that the government allocated 1.2% of its budget to foreign
aid and were then asked to choose one of four policies that they preferred the government
implement to recover an amount of national debt equivalent to 20% of the aid budget:
maintaining the foreign aid budget and allowing debt to increase, cutting spending in
other domestic programs, increasing taxes, or cutting the budget allocated to foreign aid.
A majority of the respondents (57%) chose the option of decreasing the foreign aid
budget. This finding starkly contrasts with the finding that 74% of respondents in the
same study approved or strongly approved of the Australian government giving foreign
aid. A related finding from Hurst et. al (2017) is that Americans were significantly more
likely to think aid levels were “too high” if presented with the fact that the amount of
money allocated to foreign aid was higher than the amounts allocated to popular, but less
expensive, domestic programs. These results suggest that publics in donor countries are
not supportive of aid when they perceive that money is being sent abroad rather than
being used to alleviate pressing domestic issues. They also suggest that when foreign aid
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is considered in the context of comparison to domestic issues there is a negative effect on
support.
Evidence also suggests that even when a tradeoff is not presented the public still
demonstrates more support for domestic spending than foreign aid spending. Wojtowicz
& Hanania (2017) presented survey participants with 4 domestic programs, military aid,
and economic aid and asked respondents to select whether spending should be decreased,
stay the same, or be increased for each program. For the military and economic aid
programs, 49% and 50% of respondents, respectively, thought that spending should be
decreased. On the other hand, for each domestic program, less than 25% of respondents
thought that spending should be decreased.
Many public opinion studies conducted throughout developed democracies have
found that it is possible to shift support for foreign aid in a positive direction by relating
foreign aid initiatives abroad to domestic issues. However, some studies have found that
such framing has no significant effect on public support. The results of each paper are
difficult to compare because how foreign aid policies were framed depended on the
domestic affairs of the country being analyzed at the time the analysis was taking place.
Nonetheless, there are mixed results in contention for this topic as well.
In New Zealand, for instance, only 51% of respondents in a 2018 national public
opinion survey supported the overseas aid development assistance program for the
Pacific Islands region. However, the participants were more supportive when presented
with arguments that related the aid program to the shared history between New Zealand
and the Pacific Islands region, geographic proximity, and a common understanding of
regional challenges (Aorere 2019). This finding support claims that the public is more
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supportive when foreign aid is framed around domestic issues. It also demonstrates that
the public is more inclined to provide aid to countries that they perceive to be like their
own. Similarly, Tingley (2009) found that Americans, amid the global economic crisis,
were more supportive of foreign aid when informed of potential benefits for the U.S.
economy. Overall, these studies suggest that relating aid to domestic issues and interests,
as opposed to comparing domestic and aid priorities, has a positive effect on support for
foreign aid.
Results begin to diverge due to the nature of certain shared domestic issues and
the different characteristics of the countries experiencing them. Kiratli (2021) reported
that the 2015 migrant crisis in Europe prompted an aggregate increase in public support
for aid to countries from which migrants originated. However, support varied widely
from country to country. Support was higher in countries that had larger flows of
migrants or were more economically prosperous including Finland, Denmark, France,
and Belgium. Support was constant or decreased in countries that did not experience an
influx of migrants and in relatively poorer countries including Romania, Lithuania,
Malta, and Bulgaria. Even within the study, countries within the categories described
above experienced mixed results in foreign aid opinion. For example, Sweden’s support
for foreign aid remained constant—granted, support for aid was very high before 2015—
and Slovakia and Slovenia saw an increase in public support for aid despite having
relatively low numbers of immigrants (Kiratli 2021).
Furthermore, Komiya et. al (2018) found that policy framing around the potential
economic and soft-power benefits of Japanese foreign aid increased support among
respondents within their survey, but the effect was not statistically significant. The
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authors recognize, however, that the effect may have been statistically significant if they
had a larger sample size. Similarly, Hurst et. al (2017) found that arguments stating that
foreign aid was distributed in the U.S.' best interest shifted support positively and was
statistically significant. However, it did not have nearly as strong of an effect as other
arguments presented such as those that were cost and morality-oriented. Overall, the
efficacy of framing foreign aid around domestic interests seems to have mixed results not
only around the world but within countries as well. At best, it may be possible to
conclude that this type of policy framing is dependent on the specificity and urgency of
the domestic interest and is further influenced by other demographic and institutional
factors. This may also be a function of contextual events, as public support may be
influenced by the most recent related event or news items observed.
The Morality of Providing Foreign Aid
Publics in donor countries tend to shift their opinion of foreign aid when it is
framed in a moral light. The direction of the shift can be positive or negative depending
on the argument’s perspective. In other words, the statement that “developed countries
have a moral obligation to assist developing countries” may shift opinion in the positive
direction while “foreign aid does not go to populations it is intended to because it is
abused by corrupt leaders” may do the opposite (Hurst et. al 2017). There may be a social
desirability function as well: few want to admit they overlook moral obligations out of a
fear of not conforming to social norms. This section of the analysis focuses on the
former, or “aid-positive,” moral argument.
In their study, Hurst et. al (2017) found that arguments about morality were
among the strongest and most statistically significant out of other arguments including
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self-interest, efficiency, dependency, and costs. Admittedly, the cost argument was about
as effective as the morality argument. As expected, the moral argument treatment that
stated: "vulnerable populations desperately needed foreign aid” pushed opinion in the
positive direction while the treatment that stated “corruption in recipient countries
prevents needy populations from receiving foreign aid” pushed opinion in the negative
direction. Interestingly, when both arguments were presented together the aid-positive
argument had a stronger effect than the aid-negative argument. Kull (2017) reports
multiple statistics that support Hurst et. al’s (2017) findings; for instance, 7 in 10
Americans agree that “the United States should be willing to share at least a small portion
of its wealth with those in the world who are in great need.” Kull (2017) also cites a 2017
University of Maryland Program for Public Consultation (PPC) survey which found that
even in the context of considering tradeoffs, as was discussed above in the Preferences
for Domestic Issues section of this analysis, a large majority of Americans (68%) did not
favor reducing “food aid to malnourished people, assistance in the event of disasters, aid
to refugees from political conflict.” This is slightly different from Hurst et. al’s (2017)
finding that framing surrounding the costs of aid and morality of providing aid have
relatively equal effects and suggests that the morality argument may be even stronger, at
least in the U.S. Nonetheless, both studies may indicate that a heightened sense of
morality pushes the public towards supporting humanitarian aid, but not necessarily aid
in general. This would also imply that the effects of moral and type-of-aid policy framing
are interactive. The interaction between morality and type of aid is observed similarly in
Australia. As was stated in the Type of Aid section of this analysis, a large majority of
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respondents polled in a survey (74%) favored humanitarian aid over commercial and
political aid (13%) (Wood 2018).
An analysis of Europe may be indicative of why morality-oriented policy framing
is effective. In Europe, attitudes that supported “helping the poor” and general
favorability towards humanitarian intentions allowed elite decision-makers to provide
foreign assistance to Africa (Rye Olsen 2001). However, at least according to this case
study, public knowledge of foreign aid and foreign policy regarding Africa was limited
due to insufficient media coverage; despite the lack of public concern for foreign aid,
these attitudes enabled political elites to provide aid to Africa with little to no resistance
from the public (Rye Olsen 2001). In other words, humanitarian, arguably moralistic,
attitudes did not necessarily drive public support for foreign aid, but simply the lack of
opposition did. This effect may also be an explanation for public "support" of
humanitarian aid in other developed democracies, but I have not found any literature to
substantiate that claim. In the UK on the other hand, the 2021 Annual Public Opinion
Survey on Foreign Policy and Global Britain, which is conducted by the British Foreign
Policy Group, found that citizens' rationales for supporting foreign aid are heterogeneous.
Motivations for distributing aid are quite evenly split between arguments of morality,
history, and strategy and security (Gaston 2021). This may suggest that, at least in the
UK, the morality of aid is not as significant of a consideration as it is in other
democracies, but this finding may be a result of individual or other contextual
characteristics not reported in this article. Nonetheless, most evidence suggests policy
framing that surrounds the morality of humanitarian aid is effective because publics in
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democratic donor countries tend to share benevolent attitudes and favor assisting
vulnerable populations.
Does Public Opinion Actually Matter?
Much of this analysis of public opinion has suggested that decision-making
regarding foreign aid policy is top-down rather than bottom-up, which may imply that
public opinion may actually not be that significant in determining bilateral aid flows.
Indeed, whether public opinion is significant in determining foreign aid is a major debate
within the literature in and of itself.
Primarily, Mosley (1985) recognizes that public opinion of foreign aid can work
both top-down and bottom-up in creating a supply-demand model for the foreign aid
market through the analysis of 9 OECD countries and their foreign aid flows. Actors of
supply consisted of the government, electoral patterns, and economic factors while
demand actors consisted of public opinion based on knowledge of foreign aid and
bilateral relations. Overall, he found that two market adjustment patterns shifted on the
demand side when the public applied pressure to either change the quantity or quality of
current aid levels. In response, the government would alter the aid in accordance with
public preferences. These observations are consistent with bottom-up models of decisionmaking. In the third market adjustment pattern that Mosley identified, which was also on
the demand side, the government responds to public pressure by persuading the public to
accept the aid policies they had already adopted. In other words, supply actors altered
demand, which is more in line with the top-down decision-making model.
As discussed above, Rye Olsen (2001) argues that foreign aid policy is
determined through a top-down public opinion model, with political elites making
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decisions for an ignorant public. However, as Kiratli (2021) observes, publics in Europe
generally became more favorable of aid due to the migrant crisis, a pressing issue that
was heavily covered by the media and addressed by public officials through migrantfriendly policies. Arguably, there was more leeway for political elites to centralize
decision-making when concerns about issues in developing countries received less
attention because they were considered to be distant. Thus, after the migration crisis,
public opinion toward aid in European countries became more substantiated and
informed. Conversely, this also suggests that policymakers are unlikely to promote aid if
expecting a backlash and supportive when the public seems open to it.
Similarly, Heinrich et. al (2018) find that American public opinion on providing
aid to human rights violators significantly depends upon media coverage of the security 2
and economic3 hierarchies maintained by the U.S. within a recipient country. If the public
was informed of the domestic affairs of and bilateral relations towards countries that
violated human rights, foreign aid flows were consistent with public opinion. Overall,
evidence suggests that public opinion is substantial in determining foreign aid policy,
especially when certain recipients are high-profile and of particular concern to donor
publics. Even when the public is ignorant of foreign aid, a lack of opposition towards
existing policies is inadvertently a reflection of public attitudes.

2

Lake (2009) defines the security hierarchy index as the average number of U.S. troops
deployed per capita to a “subordinate” country and the inverse of the number of
independent alliances that the “subordinate” has.
3
Lake (2009) defines the economic hierarchy index as a “subordinate” country’s relative
trade dependence on the U.S. and the inverse of the “subordinate’s” degree of monetary
autonomy. Monetary autonomy is low, for instance, if a country pegs its exchange rate to
that of the U.S. dollar.
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Perceptions of Recipient Countries
Public perceptions of recipient countries also shift public support for bilateral
foreign aid, but how do these perceptions form? One manner in which perceptions of aid
recipients are molded is through media coverage. Smillie (1999) aptly summarizes the
effects of negative media coverage on “the public in industrialized countries,” stating "As
negative images and beliefs harden and become more firmly established, it is even more
difficult to convince the public that aid can and does work."
Additionally, Europeans became more supportive of providing foreign aid
following the onset of the European migrant crisis, especially to countries of origin
(Kiratli 2021). Not only did the crisis receive a high amount of news coverage but it also
affected the daily lives of Europeans who began to work and live beside an influx of
immigrants. Thus, perceptions of aid recipients are also shaped by their domestic issues
that have spillover effects on donor countries. In other words, the domestic affairs of
recipient countries become less distant from publics in donor countries. This was also the
case with New Zealand, which experienced higher levels of support for aid to the Pacific
Islands region when the policy was framed in a context of geographic proximity and
shared regional challenges (Aorere 2019). Below, I discuss the different ways in which
these perceptions manifest themselves in public opinion of foreign aid distribution.
Effectiveness of Aid and Corruption Fatigue
Public perceptions of foreign aid surround whether foreign aid is effective or not.
The literature that falls under this topic is highly divisive, the main reason being that it is
difficult to determine whether foreign aid is effective or not. The literature on aid efficacy
constitutes a debate in and of itself but delving into the topic is outside of the scope of
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this analysis. Rather, this section of the paper will analyze public opinion studies that aim
to determine the effects of identifying aid as either effective or ineffective on public
opinion. Thus, this section is also somewhat related to the topic of how political elites
frame foreign aid policy.
How does public opinion change when aid is portrayed as being ineffective? As
Smilie (1999) has already suggested, most of the time support for aid tends to decrease
due to negative media coverage coupled with expectations that aid should significantly
decrease the adversity being observed. Many arguments that aim to defile the integrity of
foreign aid will point to evidence of systemic poverty that prevents populations within
developing countries from overcoming conflict, natural disasters, and economic hardship.
Why poverty persists, they also believe, is due to weak institutions and corrupt rentseeking (Aidt et. al 2008; Aidt 2003; Svensson 2000) that results in the abuse of foreign
aid resources and the further cementation of corruption (World Bank 1998; Alesina &
Weder 2002; Jablonski 2014). When the public perceives corruption in a general sense,
associating corruption with developing countries overall can cause aid fatigue 4, or in
other words a lack of support for providing foreign aid (Bauhr et. al 2013). Findings from
Hurst et. al (2017) reported that framing corruption from a moral standpoint, for which
they utilized the statement “aid is lost to corruption,” significantly and negatively altered
attitudes towards aid.
However, the relationship between corruption and aid is nuanced. According to a
public opinion study by Bauhr et. al (2013), which analyzed the 2009 Eurobarometer
survey, the effect of corruption fatigue is highly contextual and can be mitigated by moral

4

“Aid fatigue” is interchangeably used with “corruption fatigue.”
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or strategic motivations. For instance, if the public thinks that humanitarian aid is
desperately needed by a vulnerable population residing within a corrupt regime, a
majority may still opt for such aid to be disbursed. Moreover, if a public perceives a poor,
corrupt regime to be a future trading partner, they may still opt to provide aid to that
regime with hopes of creating a new export market in the future. This concept is what
Bauhr et. al (2013) term the “aid-corruption paradox.” Heinrich et. al (2018) and Heinrich
and Kobayashi (2020) reach similar conclusions from their studies on the American
public. They find that citizens do not fully support their government withholding aid from
human rights abusers if 1) the U.S. has high levels of bilateral engagement with such
countries and 2) such recipient states offer important policy benefits. An economic
analysis of foreign aid flows to recipient countries supports the findings from above,
finding no evidence suggesting that corrupt countries receive less foreign aid than noncorrupt countries (Alesina & Weder 2002).
Much of the quantitative analysis for this thesis concerns how perceptions of
different regimes impact support for aid and is based on corruption fatigue theory. Thus, I
will establish the connection between corruption and regime in this section of the
literature review. Low political accountability, founded on weak institutions, is closely
correlated with high levels of regime corruption (Aidt 2003; Aidt et. al 2008). More
specifically, procedural democracies, not non-democracies, that have not obtained
substantive democracy are associated with higher levels of corruption (Hariss-White &
White 1996). Moreover, perceptions of corruption are linked to the level of democracy
within a regime, but how this is perceived by the public, or if the above literature is even
perceived accurately, is unclear. One may assume that the public in most democracies
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equates democracies as less corrupt, regardless of actual evidence, since it’s a readily
available heuristic. Throughout this thesis, I address how public perceptions of different
types of regimes, in connection with how they may perceive corruption based on public
opinion data, affect support for bilateral aid.
Conversely, how is public opinion altered when they perceive aid to be effective?
Hurst et. al (2017) found that when they framed effectiveness using facts, such as
attaining desirable policy outcomes in recipient countries, this line of framing had a small
effect on public opinion compared to arguments surrounding morals and costs
surrounding foreign aid. Likewise, Komiya et. al (2018) found that both of their
arguments stating that aid either had an “uncertain effect” or “definitive effect” on
recipient countries did not significantly alter the attitudes of survey respondents.
However, when they stated more specific benefits that aid had on recipient countries,
“micro-level” and “macro-level” educational effects, attitudes towards aid were altered
significantly and positively. The results from these studies imply that framing aid policy
in a manner that simply states “aid is effective” is not persuasive enough for the masses
to shift their attitudes. Rather, a more constructive method of convincing the public to
alter their stances on the effectiveness of aid is by informing them of specific, tangible
benefits that have been secured through bilateral ODA in the past. As these studies also
proved it may be sufficient to not include which countries these benefits were observed
in, further suggesting that bilateral perceptions of corruption are not tremendously
significant to donor publics. Overall, this implies that narrowly defined aid with clear
goals, as opposed to broad packages, would likely receive greater support.
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Domestic Institutional Structures
Similar to how perceptions of recipient countries shape public opinion of aid,
perceptions of how effective donor publics think their own government is affects their
views of how effective foreign aid is. Other attitudes towards their government, namely
what they consider to be government's role in society and outlooks on public spending,
shape their views of foreign aid more generally. This section explores debates in the
literature about the effects of different institutional structures on public opinion of foreign
aid.
The Domestic Welfare State
Conventional wisdom would dictate that public attitudes towards international
redistributive policies like foreign aid reflect their attitudes towards domestic
redistributive policies. For instance, Noel and Therien (2002) conclude from 1995
Eurobarometer responses that in donor countries with social-democratic qualities and
institutions, publics value equality and are thereby more likely to support international
redistribution policies such as foreign aid. Similarly, Divens & Constantelos (2009) find
that public support for foreign aid is higher in Europe than in the U.S. because foreign aid
corresponds with the overall European belief that the government has a significant role in
addressing social issues. Thus, foreign aid aligns with European core values, but the same
cannot be said for the U.S., where the state is less involved in the economy than in other
developed countries (Divens & Constantelos 2009).
However, other studies demonstrate that this may not necessarily be the case.
Zimmerman (2007), who bases his theoretical premise on the work of Noel and Therien
(2002), was surprised to find that the results of his cross-sectional time-series analysis
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were not significant and thus inconclusive. At best, when methodological requirements
for the analysis were eased, coefficients for decommodification 5 and the cumulative
power of the left6, contrary to what might be expected, had statistically significant effects
in the negative direction. Perhaps this relationship is observed because, as Inglehart
(1990) suggests, there is a diminishing marginal utility7 for equality. Thus, in donor states
that have a more conservative welfare system, for which there is a higher degree of
commodification for essential services, domestic income inequality and poverty are
typically relatively higher and of greater concern to the public. Consequently, the public
is more likely to value redistributive policies and foreign aid. Conversely, in donor states
with a more liberal welfare system, where income inequality and poverty are not of great
concern, publics are less likely to value redistributive policies at the domestic and
international level. Therefore, they are less likely to support foreign aid (Inglehart 1990).
This explanation is refuted by findings from Chong and Gradstein (2008) concluding that
domestic income inequality has a "detrimental" effect on public support for aid. Overall,
it is difficult to deduce the effect of domestic welfare structures on support for foreign
aid. Evidence for different theories is generally scattered and inconclusive.

5

According to the English Encyclopedia (2021) “decommodification” is “the degree to
which welfare services are free of the market. In a predominantly decommodified system,
welfare services such as education and healthcare are provided to all and are not linked to
market processes.” In the context of Zimmerman (2007), the independent variable for the
degree of decommodification observed in a state is measured utilizing an index.
6
In the context of Zimmerman (2007), the cumulative power of the left pertains to the
proportion of left-wing politicians in Cabinet positions. This variable operates under the
assumption that when there is a higher percentage of left-wing individuals in a Cabinet,
they have more power to affect welfare and foreign aid policies.
7
Diminishing marginal utility is an economic concept stating that the amount of utility,
or satisfaction, acquired from one additional unit of a product begins to decline as the
total quantity of that product increases.
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Efficacy of Government Spending
A concept that is related to the structure of welfare spending is public perceptions
of how efficient their government is. The extant literature surrounding this topic, though,
is more convergent than the effects of welfare structures. Views on government
efficiency are also related to notions of political trust and attitudes towards public
spending, both of which are somewhat moderated by political ideology (Rudolph &
Evans 2005; Chong & Gradstein 2008). In this section of the analysis, however, the
effects of political ideology will only be discussed in the context of its relationship to
views on government efficiency.
Links between views on government efficiency, specifically as it relates to
spending, and foreign aid is best exemplified by Aorere’s (2019) analysis of public
opinion in New Zealand. Among the 31% of the sample who considered overseas aid and
development efficient based their opinions on "faith that overseas aid spending is
effective, in the absence of evidence: namely that spending is helping people in need, aid
is sent for disaster relief and [we] help neighboring countries" (Aorere 2019). This
demonstrates that confidence in government, which is similar to political trust, plays a
role in opinion because it shapes the publics' perception regarding whether the
government will send aid to where/whom it is promised and to what it is intended for.
Divens and Constantelos (2009) present “straightforward” evidence that public
opinion of foreign aid is related to confidence in government, among other explanatory
factors, and that lower support for foreign aid in the U.S. than in Europe can be partially
explained by lower levels of trust in government. On the contrary, Paxton & Knack
(2012), through an analysis of a 17-country sample of the 2002 Gallup International
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Survey, found that trust in government (“political trust”) had no significant effect on
public support for foreign aid. These two findings stand in stark contrast to each other.
While the findings may be different due to the use of two different public opinion surveys
that originated from two different years, they may also be the result of two completely
different country samples, further suggesting that country-level variance plays a large
factor in aid opinion.
Using a sample of 81 developed and developing countries, a much broader sample
than those used in Paxton and Knack (2012) and Divens and Constantelos (2009), Chong
and Gradstein (2008) found that confidence in government had a strong and highly
significant effect on public support in the positive direction. They elaborate that
government efficiency plays a significant role in determining public opinion because it
relates to whether the government efficiently spends public coffers for both domestic and
international initiatives. Rudolph and Evans (2005) argue that political trust is positively
correlated with public support for government spending but can be moderated by
ideology, especially conservative ideology, at the individual level. Chong and Gradstein
(2008) go further, though, and argue that there is no relationship between the political
position of domestic governments and support for aid. They found that when accounting
for whether the Chief Executive of a donor country was a member of a left-wing party,
under the assumption that leftist governments tend to provide higher levels of foreign aid,
confidence in government shadowed these effects. Together, these findings may suggest
that confidence in government as motivated by an individual's ideology has a stronger
effect on public support for aid than the dominant ideology of democratically elected or
appointed governments. Nonetheless, the literature seems to point toward the significance
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of own government efficiency, specifically as it concerns public spending, in shaping
public opinion of foreign aid on the aggregate level.
Individual-Level Determinants of Foreign Aid
Up until now, most of this analysis has reviewed determinants of public opinion
on aid as it pertains to the aggregate, but determinants can be further broken down to the
individual level. Moreover, there are demographic and personal characteristics that
influence an individual’s favorability towards foreign aid that, when aggregated,
influence a donor country’s public opinion of aid in general. This section will be broken
up into demographic factors, political attitudes and beliefs, and psychological behaviors
that influence an individual’s opinion of foreign assistance.
Demographic Factors
Most of the demographic factors that have been analyzed in the extant literature,
at best, have a mild effect on an individual's opinion of foreign aid. Two of the most
significant demographics for analysis at the individual level are income and education.
Due to the highly correlative nature of the two variables, it is difficult to separate the
effects of the two.
Milner and Tingley (2012) and Paxton and Knack (2012) find that individuals
who are employed in professional sectors, which tend to require higher levels of
education, and those who have higher incomes are more favorable of foreign aid. This is
consistent with theory that capital/economic endowments drive preferences. Milner and
Tingley (2012) point to a much larger debate surrounding what constitutes a sufficient
proxy to measure such endowments, but that debate is outside of the scope of this paper.
A moderate degree of significance is demonstrated in Wood’s (2018) analysis of
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Australia, which points to a modestly positive, modestly significant, beta coefficient for
education in estimations for an ordered logistic regression model. The significance of the
education model, however, was small relative to other variables such as opinions
motivated by ideological stance, which will be discussed further down. This is also
exemplified by research by the British Foreign Policy Group in the UK, which finds that
individuals who have lower socioeconomic status and live in less prosperous areas are
more likely to question foreign aid spending (Gaston 2021). The rationale provided for
this observation is that “undoubtedly… they consider their own standing within British
society, and perceive that structural economic inequalities persist here,” or in other words
implicitly distinguishing the significance of foreign aid from the significance of domestic
issues. This is consistent with some of the findings in the Domestic Welfare State section
that argue perceptions of prevailing domestic inequality result in lower public support for
foreign aid (Chong & Gradstein 2008).
One demographic that has mixed findings of significance is gender. Theory
dictates that women are generally more supportive of aid than men because they rate
themselves higher in altruism and have differing, usually more progressive, policy
preferences from men (cited in Paxton & Knack 2012). Wood (2018) finds that men are
more supportive of aid, and Paxton and Knack (2012) find women are more supportive,
but in both studies the effects of gender are mild. Burcu (2017) also finds that men are
more supportive of aid than women but differs from Wood (2018) in that the effect of
gender is relatively large and significant. On the contrary, Chong & Gradstein (2008) find
that gender has no significant effect on aid support at all. The split in findings is most
likely due to country-level differences, differences in methodology or variations in the
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type or scope of aid, but the effect of gender is inconclusive overall. Lastly, most
literature seems to find that age has little to no effect on opinion of aid (Wood 2018;
Paxton & Knack 2012; Chong & Gradstein 2008) with the exception of Burcu (2017),
who found that a one-year increase in age has a very significant and relatively large,
negative effect on public support.
Political Attitudes and Beliefs
General ideological leanings and political attitudes towards poverty, income
inequality, and political participation serve as sufficiently accurate proxies for an
individual’s support for foreign aid. Most left-right divides consistently predict how
favorable an individual is towards foreign aid, but sometimes, as in Australia, there is no
clear left-right divide when foreign aid spending is widely favored (Wood 2018). This
may suggest that for individuals in certain donor countries, other determinants, such as
confidence in government or moral outlooks, have a stronger effect on opinion.
Paxton and Knack (2012) find that the more conservative an individual is, they
are significantly less likely to support the foreign aid. This is not surprising considering
that conservatives have less-than-favorable attitudes toward the role of government in
addressing social issues and towards redistributive policies both domestically and
internationally (Rudolph & Evans 2005; Chong & Gradstein 2008). Liberals tend to be
more supportive of foreign aid because they are more comfortable with government
intervention and favor social equality more than conservatives (Pew Research Center
2020; Milner & Tingley 2013).
Milner and Tingley (2013) go further to suggest that there is a liberal-conservative
divide over economic, or developmental, aid. Conversely, the moralistic inclinations that
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drive support for providing humanitarian aid where needed, regardless of the strategic
policy goals of a donor country, imply that liberal-conservative divides are less relevant
in determining opinion on aid (Hurst et. al 2017; Kull 2017; Wood 2018; Rye Olsen
2001). These two patterns imply that the degree to which ideology plays a role in shaping
an individual’s opinion on foreign aid is limited.
Some literature also explores how specific attitudes towards poverty and
inequality predict an individual’s opinion on foreign aid. Paxton and Knack (2012) found
that the more respondents agreed with the statement “the poor are lazy,” the less likely
they were to support foreign aid. However, this view had a much weaker and less
significant effect on opinion than the statement “the poor can escape poverty,” which
moderately and positively shifted support for aid. On a slightly different note, and
contrary to Chong and Gradstein’s (2008) findings, Wood (2018) found that Australians’
worries about domestic poverty significantly shifted support for aid in a positive
direction.
Overall, the literature seems to agree that interest in politics on both the domestic
and international levels are substantial predictors of an individual’s opinion on foreign
aid. Burcu (2017) and Paxton and Knack (2012) report that interest in politics has a
highly significant and positive effect on support for foreign aid. This may be the case
because individuals who are more interested in politics are more aware of domestic and
international issues, the needs of vulnerable foreign populations, and the benefits of
foreign abroad both domestically and abroad. Similarly, individuals who consume more
media are significantly more likely to support aid (Paxton & Knack 2012; Burcu 2017;
Wood 2018). It is slightly more difficult to discern the effects of involvement in
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international politics on support for aid due to variations in methodology between studies
and the scant amount of literature that includes such analysis. Nonetheless, Paxton and
Knack (2012) find that if an individual views themselves as being a “member of the
world” and if they have higher levels of trust towards the United Nations and World
Bank, they are more likely to support aid. Similarly, Wood (2018) reports that an increase
in “favorable views of multilaterals” is associated with a higher affinity toward aid.
Psychological Behaviors
Personal beliefs and attitudes held by individuals are also indicative of altruistic
behaviors, and thus motives behind public opinion of foreign aid. There seems to be
agreeance in the literature surrounding the strength and significance of effects for factors
such as trust and financial satisfaction. For other factors, namely religiosity, there is more
ambiguity regarding the size and significance of their impact. Admittedly, though, there
is scant literature on this particular topic of foreign aid determinants.
Perhaps counterintuitively, those who are more confident in their ability to
manage their financial debts tend to be more supportive of foreign aid. The greater the
sense of financial security of an individual, the more likely they are to support foreign aid
distribution (Paxton & Knack 2011; Chong & Gradstein 2008) because they are less riskaverse and are thus more likely to demonstrate altruistic tendencies. Those with less
financial security are less likely to support foreign aid, especially when they believe they
themselves need aid from the government (Burcu 2017).
There is also convergence around the effects of generalized trust, or an
individual’s propensity to trust others. Also called agency, generalized trust is a crucial
component in the moral calculus of an individual’s support for foreign aid (Paxton &
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Knack 2012; Burcu 2017). Those with higher levels of trust are more likely to want to aid
“beggars” even if they are strangers (Burcu 2017).
Literature that examines the effects of religiosity, or how often one attends
religious services regardless of religion and denomination, report mixed effects. For
instance, Paxton and Knack (2012) find that religiosity has a minimal, almost negligible,
impact on an individual’s support for foreign aid whereas Burcu (2017) finds that
religiosity has a highly significant and positive impact. Wood (2018) finds that
Australians who hardly ever attend religious services and Australians who do not attend
religious services at all are moderately more inclined to favor foreign aid. Although
coefficients for more religious Australians are more positive, they are not significant. The
results of these studies may suggest that religiosity has an interaction effect on foreign aid
opinion with other determinants such as generalized trust, political leanings, and type of
aid.
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PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF AID IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH KOREA
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF AID IN THE UNITED STATES
Most literature on U.S. public opinion of aid centers around whether foreign
assistance itself is favored or not. However, it is important to note this thesis also
analyzes public opinion of foreign aid in the context of recipients the public thinks are
most deserving of aid, or regime prioritization. Nonetheless, I will still review existing
literature.
It is commonly known that the U.S. plays a significant, dominant role in handling
foreign affairs, including in distributing foreign aid (Paxton & Knack 2011). However,
compared to the publics of other donor European countries, Americans are the least
supportive of foreign aid. At the state level, countries in Europe have foreign aid approval
rates that vary anywhere between 68.7% to 95.4% while only a slim majority of the U.S.
public (54%) is supportive (Diven & Constantelos 2009). One reason support for aid is
relatively low may be that many Americans have become disillusioned with the
overextension of U.S. power in the international arena; this disillusionment was harped
upon by Donald Trump during his presidency and reflected by the former president’s
multiple attempts to slash the USAID budget (Kull 2017; Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017).
Trump’s increasingly isolationist policies led to the polarization of foreign aid support,
despite historical bipartisan support of foreign aid funding. Another reason for low
support may also be that Americans tend to prioritize domestic over international
spending, preferring budget cuts in foreign assistance over cuts in domestic welfare
spending (Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017; Chong & Gradstein 2008). A final reason is that
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Americans prioritize other foreign policy initiatives, such as protecting American jobs
and nuclear non-proliferation, over foreign aid initiatives. The lack of support for foreign
aid, however, contrasts with the fact that 69% and 66% of Americans see military and
economic aid, respectively, as an effective means for achieving foreign policy goals
(Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017).
The idea that Americans support the potential benefits of distributing military and
economic aid, yet do not support aid more generally contrasts with reality; the U.S. has
thoroughly demonstrated its commitment to military and economic aid abroad to promote
foreign policy. Before the COVID-19 pandemic in FY2019, the top aid-spending
category for the U.S. was peace and security, which constituted approximately 34% of
foreign aid obligations, or $16.1 billion. Economic development was the fourth-largest
spending category at $3.9 billion (U.S. Agency for International Development 2021).
Before the pandemic, which shifted aid priorities towards funding health programs in
developing countries, the U.S. provided aid for many initiatives that the public has
historically been supportive of including humanitarian assistance, democracy and
governance, and human rights. This may suggest that the public has a poor sense of
where foreign aid goes. The public’s current understanding may stem from high-profile
incidents showcased by mass media, which tend to have a greater focus on failures of
U.S. military assistance in developing countries (U.S. Agency for International
Development 2021; Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017).
Even though Americans are less supportive of foreign aid than Europeans,
Americans are actually more supportive of it than surface-level public opinion polls
would indicate. Despite the economic benefits of foreign aid, more Americans believe
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that it should be prioritized for countries with the poorest economies rather than for
countries needed as U.S. trade partners. Conversely, in a humanitarian aid context, more
Americans support the idea that the U.S. should send food aid where needed than only
sending aid to areas where the U.S. has security interests (Kull 2017). Only 10% of
Americans support the idea of increasing economic and military aid to other nations, but
when assistance is described in a mission-specific manner, for example as aid to
“promote democracy” or “aid for disaster relief,” support for distribution increases to
56% and 82%, respectively (Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017).
This dichotomy of supporting the intentions of aid but not wanting to pay for it is
a result of Americans’ tendency to overestimate the foreign aid budget, which is
simultaneously balanced out by the altruistic appeal of donating aid (Wojtowicz &
Hanania 2017; Kull 2017). This phenomenon may also be indicative of a public that is
not deeply committed to policy issues surrounding foreign aid. Some conservative
estimates show that Americans believe aid comprises 8.5% of the federal budget, but
many others show that Americans believe aid takes up 28% of the federal budget
(Chicago Council 2014 cited in Wojtowicz & Hanania 2017; Klein 2013).
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF AID TO NORTH KOREA IN SOUTH KOREA
North Korean and South Korean Development
The challenges South Korea faces in distributing aid to North Korea are best
understood in the context of North Korea’s social, political, and economic development
in comparison to South Korea’s. North Korea and South Korea were created following
WWII when the U.S. and the Soviet Union (USSR) split Korea along the 38 th parallel
with the U.S. occupying the south and the USSR occupying the north. In line with the
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dominance of these world powers, South Korean and North Korean economic
development followed largely capitalist and communist developments, respectively (Cha
2012; Oh & Hassig 2000).
South Korea is often viewed by the international community as a developmental
success story and economic miracle. It is the only country to have ascended from the
development assistance community (DAC) to a donor country of ODA in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Kim & Oh 2012). Though
South Korea is currently a high-tech industrialized economy, its GDP per capita was
comparable with those of developing nations in the 1960s (NationMaster 2014). South
Korea’s economy witnessed rapid growth during the 1970s under Park Chung-Hee, who
encouraged investment in heavy industry and chemical facilities. This line of policy and
the adoption of export-oriented economic development plans formed a basis on which
South Korea would become one of the world’s largest exporters of heavy industrial
products. Now, it is one of the world’s top 10% of exporters and one of the world’s
largest economies (Korea.net 2020; NationMaster 2014).
On the other hand, North Korea followed a different path under the USSR’s
influence. North Korea’s economy is centrally planned and closed off. After the USSR
instilled Kim Il-Sung as President of the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK), Kim
built his nation with Confucian and Stalinist elements and founded the nation’s
predominant, and only, political ideology: Juche socialism (Oh & Hassig 2000). Juche is
an ideology of self-reliant autarky and serving the State with filial piety (Cha 2012).
Juche socialism not only enabled the Kims, particularly Kim Il-Sung, to consolidate
totalitarian power but also allowed for poor economic planning and foreign policy to
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occur. North Korea GDP growth is stagnant and, as of 2019, approximately 54 times
smaller than South Korea’s (Statista 2021). Industrial and power output have also
remained stagnant, and food shortages are chronic (NationMaster 2014).
Overall, South Korea’s economy fares much better than North Korea’s; North
Korea’s state has made it reliant on foreign assistance from the international community
to resolve humanitarian crises (Cha & Lloyd 2021; Manyin & Nikitin 2014). In more
recent history, North Korea has continuously been provided humanitarian aid by the
international community for fifteen years, with South Korea being one of North Korea’s
largest donors (Kim 2014). Even though the amount of aid it has distributed has declined
since 2008 when Lee Myung-Bak ascended to the presidency, North Korea relies on aid
from both the South Korean government and South Korean NGOs (Kim 2014; Manyin &
Nikitin 2014).
History of Aid Failure in North Korea
To effectively analyze South Korean attitudes toward providing aid to the north, it
is essential to understand the past success, or lack thereof, of foreign assistance in North
Korea. The historic inefficiency of aid in North Korea helps to explain why South
Koreans are skeptical of providing assistance now and in the future (Aaltola 1999;
Haggard & Ryu 2012).
One of the most notable examples of humanitarian aid failure began in the 1990s
when North Korea asked the international society for foreign assistance to end its worst
famine to date (Kim 2014; Aaltola 1999). Although North Korea was able to put an end
to its Arduous March, as of 2019 40% of North Koreans were in urgent need of food
assistance, and North Korea remains highly vulnerable to food shortages (United Nations
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Food Program 2019; Haggard & Noland 2007). This is among other related food
insecurity issues, severe declines in agricultural production, and inefficiencies in the
state’s Public Distribution System (PDS) (United Nations Food Program 2019).
North Korea, despite receiving developmental assistance, has failed to effectively
feed its citizens in the long run due to institutional corruption. This follows a consistent
trend of development assistance failures due to the North Korean government diverting
resources from welfare allocations (Kim 2014; Silberstein 2018 (a)). Under the
administration of Kim Il-Sung, foreign aid was mostly used to consolidate state power as
North Korea consistently declined on several development indicators (Kim 2014; Oh &
Hassig 2000). Additionally, the Congressional Research Service reports “multiple
sources have asserted that some of the food assistance is routinely diverted for resale in
private markets or other uses” and that “the North Korean government restricts the ability
of donors to operate in the country” (Manyin & Nikitin 2014). Admittedly, though, it is
difficult to quantify the effect of development assistance in North Korea as data for key
indicators such as the Human Development Index, Gross Domestic Product, poverty
level, Purchase Power Parity, and Gini Coefficient are scant (World Bank Group 2019;
United Nations Development Program 2019). Regardless, more analyses of the North
Korean economy are indicative of consistent economic stagnation and decline (Oh &
Hassig 2000; Cha & Lloyd 2021).
Moreover, acts of aggression toward South Korea and North Korea’s conduction
of nuclear and ballistic missile tests are also viewed as failures of development
assistance, especially in the context of diplomacy and security (Haggard & Ryu 2012;
Kim & Friedhoff 2011; Jeong 2015; Aaltola 1999). Generally, a norm of reciprocity,

37

typically by means of regulated state behavior, is expected out of a recipient country by
donor countries as long as the latter sponsors their aid, though North Korea tends to fall
through on these obligations as North Korea is more aggressive and non-compliant than
most aid-dependent states (Aaltola 1999; Hogarth 2012; Lee 2010; Manyin & Nikitin
2014). The 2002 nuclear crisis, the 2006 nuclear test, and the sinking of the Cheonan in
2010, after all of which support for aid had significantly decreased, are examples of
security threats that have been associated with aid failure and corruption fatigue (Haggard
& Ryu 2012; Jeong 2015). North Korea’s resistance to denuclearization on multiple
occasions is also viewed as a failure of aid by westerners, though the United States shares
a small portion of the blame according to South Koreans (Manyin & Nikitin 2014; Jeong
2015).
Many studies have attributed the long-run failure of development aid to the
structure of North Korea’s economy (Kim 2014). North Korea’s economic system is a
tightly state-controlled, mixed-Socialist economy with no coherent economic policy
(Stiftung 2020; Kim 2014). North Korea’s economy is subject to the established chronic
failures of planned economies: economic mismanagement and resulting stagnation in
growth. As a result of no cogent tax-collection system and the lack of necessary
infrastructure, the North Korean population suffers from poor state resource management
and virtually nonexistent or inefficient distributive welfare programs (Stiftung 2020;
United Nations Food Program 2019).
More so than the country’s economy, North Korea’s sociopolitical environment is
a driving factor in the failure of foreign aid efforts. Generally, themes of power,
authoritarianism, and corruption dominate North Korean political and foreign aid
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literature (Kim 2014; Oh & Hassig 2000). Failures in its social safety net mainly stem
from the state’s emphasis on authoritarianism and the priority allocation of resources to
elite citizens under the strict organization of the social Songbun system (Stiftung 2020).
Furthermore, most citizens do not receive the aid they need and/or are promised due to
widespread corruption (Aaltola 1999). The distribution of foreign aid and other welfare
resources only tends to favor the powerful few with the right political connections
(Stiftung 2020). In the past, the prevalence of corruption has led to the diversion of
foreign aid resources from ordinary North Korean citizens to soldiers, many symbolic-not practical-- state-building projects, weaponry development, and even imported luxury
goods (Silberstein 2018(b); Aaltola 1999; Hogarth 2012).
Another related, prevalent historical aspect of aid policy towards North Korea was
the implementation of the Sunshine Policy by President Kim Dae Jung in 1998. The goal
of this policy was to promote cooperation between the two states, primarily through the
disbursement of economic aid and re-establishing lines of communication and financial
flow, in long-term hopes of Korean reunification (Hogarth 2012; Lee 2010). However, in
maintaining consistency with historical trends, the North failed to uphold its reciprocal
obligations about the policy, ultimately resulting in the policy’s end and perceived failure
(Hogarth 2012).
Though aid has not succeeded in generally improving North Korea’s humanitarian
crisis, hope is retained that aid can pave a path for progress in inter-Korean relations.
Over the four years of being provided humanitarian aid throughout the Arduous March,
North Korea became relatively more open to the international community (Smith 1999).
Many thought that the foundational relationships established between North Korea and
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various humanitarian aid agencies would lead to increased, productive policy engagement
with the country (Smith 1999). Though levels of aid contributions had declined since
2008, in 2014 President Park stated that preparations for an open era of unification were
to be made including strengthening humanitarian aid (Park 2014). However, North Korea
remains a global security threat and continues to endure an immense humanitarian crisis.
Although many challenges remain to be resolved between North Korea and South Korea,
both diplomatically and in foreign aid developments, there is potential for humanitarian
aid to force North Korea into negotiations at the very least (Manyin & Nikitin 2014).
South Koreans’ Perceptions of North Korea
Historically, support for providing aid to the north has largely been contingent on
South Koreans’ perceptions of North Korea (Jeong 2015; Haggard & Ryu 2012).
Generally, there is a negative correlation between South Koreans’ perceived insecurity
and their support for distributing aid to North Korea, though threats to security are
relatively stable unless provoked by a specific event (Jeong 2015). Interestingly, under
the Lee and Park administrations, which emphasized joint economic cooperation rather
than unconditional aid following the end of the Sunshine Policy era in 2008, the public
struck a balance in opinion between reducing/suspending aid and expanding/maintaining
aid (Jeong 2015). By extension, this implies that the public struck a balance in supporting
inter-Korean cooperation. At its highest disapproval rate in 2006, 70% of South Koreans
supported the notion of aid decreasing or being stopped altogether following a series of
DPRK nuclear and ballistic missile tests (Haggard & Ryu 2012); a similar decline in
popularity of aid occurred in 2010 following the sinking of the Cheonan (Kim &
Friedhoff 2011). Despite North Korea’s development of weapons of mass destruction,
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South Koreans view this as less of a security threat than South Korea’s vulnerability to an
artillery attack by the north (Lee 2012). Overall, these events and subsequent changes in
public opinion on aid towards North Korea suggest that support is influenced by
contemporary events.
South Koreans frequently debate the question of how to deal with North Korea
(Kim et. al 1996). Broader foreign aid literature suggests that perceived corruption in a
recipient country by donor countries reduces overall support for aid in donor countries
(Bauhr et. al 2013; Diven 2009). In South Korea, conflicting views of North Korea’s
intentions underly this debate: as an enemy and militarist aggressor versus as brethren of
part of a bigger nation (Kim et. al 1996). The former of these views, or the realists,
suggest that North Korea’s political and economic differences, in addition to historical
bilateral conflict, should result in a hard-liner approach to regulating North Korean
behavior through deterrence and by seeking unification on their own (South Korea’s)
terms. The latter of the views, or the nationalists, support engagement with the North
through a soft-liner approach through rapprochement and ultimate unification (Kim et. al
1996). This analysis can be extended to foreign aid applications. Interestingly, South
Korea’s ODA in general is highly dependent on its own economic interests rather than
the recipient’s needs. However, when considering South Korea’s aid to its poorest
recipients, only population factors are significant in influencing how much aid the
country receives as opposed to economic factors such as the recipient country’s income,
economic growth, and bilateral trade flows with South Korea (Kim & Oh 2012). In the
context of providing aid to North Korea, although South Koreans generally view aid as
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ineffective, the moral obligation to assist its general population in the short run outweighs
the desire to decrease or stop aid altogether (Silberstein 2018(a)).
More generally, many South Koreans do not have a favorable view of North
Korea, though engagement with North Korea is not generally thought to be important
among the public. From 2004 to 2014, South Korea’s favorability toward North Korea
declined by approximately 39%, and over that same period ,70% of South Koreans
believed that north-south relations had worsened (Jeong 2015). North-south relations,
however, has low issue saliency among the public, which suggests that South Koreans are
not preparing for unification, the overarching goal of South Korea’s aid policy towards
North Korea (Kim & Friedhoff 2011). In fact, support for reunification has declined
primarily due to its perceived economic burden (Jiyoon et. al 2015). The indifferent,
negative view of North Korea is consistent with the finding that public support for aid to
North Korea, in comparison to other political issues, has been and always will be low
(Haggard and Ryu 2012; Jeong 2015; Kim & Friedhoff 2011).
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UNITED STATES PUBLIC OPINION 2020: EFFECTS OF FRAMING TYPE OF AID
AND RECIPIENT REGIMES
Data and Methodology
To determine the factors that shape public opinion of foreign aid in the United States,
summary and ordered logistic regression analyses were applied to an original public
opinion survey conducted through Amazon mTurk in July 2020. The survey had 1035
individual respondents who were conveniently sampled in the U.S. A summary table for
the variables used within the data can be viewed below in Table 1:
Table 1: Data Summary for Amazon mTurk July 2020 Survey
Variable

(N)

Mean

𝑨𝒊𝒅 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕
𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄, 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍
𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄, 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄
𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄, 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒊𝒏𝒈
𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄, 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄
𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏, 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍
𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏, 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄
𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏, 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒊𝒏𝒈
𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏, 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄
𝑴𝒂𝒍𝒆
𝑼𝒓𝒃𝒂𝒏
𝑹𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍
𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆
𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕
𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏
𝑳𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆
𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔
𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚
𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔
𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕 𝒊𝒏 𝒇𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒈𝒐𝒗𝒕
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒅𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒔
𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚

1027
1035
1035
1035
1035
1035
1035
1035
1035
1030
1035
1035
1027
1032
1035
1035
1032
1032
1024
1024
1024
1027
1027
1024

.4284
.1277
.1333
.1227
.1267
.1256
.1092
.1246
.1227
.5466
.3005
.1681
3.3632
4.5291
.5169
.2734
.5543
.3188
3.2080
3.5518
3.7207
1.8724
3.2795
2.5156
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Standard
Deviation
.4951
.3337
.3401
.3283
.3327
.3316
.3120
.3305
.3283
.4981
.4587
.3742
1.6689
1.2701
.5000
.4459
.4973
.4662
1.0250
.9734
1.0713
.6969
1.1303
1.6737

Min

Max

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
9
7
1
1
1
1
5
5
5
4
5
6

Within the survey, an eight-version experimental design question was
implemented to gauge public opinion on foreign aid based on the types of aid being
distributed, in this case, economic or humanitarian, and regimes of recipient countries.
The eight versions were equally distributed among respondents, and they could choose to
answer either “no” or “yes.” It is important to note that version 1 of the question serves as
the control variable for economic aid and version 5 serves as the control for humanitarian
aid. The design for the question is presented in Figure 1:
Figure 1: Experimental Question Design from Amazon mTurk July 2020 Public 8

To gauge differences in opinion between support for distributing economic and
humanitarian aid to certain types of regimes, four identical regression models are run for
both types of aid. In other words, I examine economic and humanitarian aid separately
for a total of eight regression models. The first hypothesis being is that the variations in
each version of the question, for each type of aid, will have a significantly different effect
from the control version of each type of aid on the dependent variable. The second

8

Highlighting and bolding are for emphasis in Figure 1 and are not in the original survey.
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hypothesis being tested is that there will be differences in the types of regimes and
demographic and attitudinal factors that have a significant effect on the dependent
variable between economic and humanitarian aid. Thus, hypothesis testing is based on a
two-tailed test.
Support for aid, or 𝑨𝒊𝒅 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕i, is based on whether respondents said “no” or
“yes” to one of the eight versions of the experimental question and serves as the
dependent variable for this experiment. It is a dichotomous variable with a (0) indicating
a response of “no” and a (1) indicating a response of “yes.” Additionally, eight separate
dummy variables were created to indicate which version of the question was received by
the respondent. A (1) in either eight of these variables signals the version of the question
received by the individual and a (0) signals which versions of the question were not
received by the respondent.
The first regression model only considers the versions of the question asked and
serves as a benchmark model where 𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒔𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 indicates whether the i-th individual
in the sample supports distributing foreign aid or not:
𝑨𝒊𝒅 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 +
𝜷𝟑 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
(1)
Demographic variables from the survey are also included in the regression
models. 𝑴𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊 is coded into a dummy variable, with (0) indicating a female and (1)
indicating a male. Following similar coding, separate dummy variables were created for
𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊 and 𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒊 to capture the effect of each party identification on aid
support. Identifying as members of either the libertarian or green parties or not
identifying with a party at all serve as the baseline for the party identification variables.
𝑼𝒓𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒊 and 𝑹𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒊 are also separate dummy variables to indicate whether a respondent

45

resides in either an urban or rural location with a (1) and a (0) to indicate otherwise. In
this case, residing in a suburban area serves as the baseline. 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 is a categorical
variable with the coding: (1) Some high school/No diploma, (2) high school diploma or
GED, (3) Some college/no degree, (4) associate’s degree, (5) bachelor’s degree, (6)
master’s degree, and (7) professional degree (MD, JD, MBA) or PhD. Annual
𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊 level is coded into $25,000 quintiles. The lowest income bracket,
$0-$24,999, is coded as a (1) and the highest income bracket, $200,000 and up, is coded
as a “9.” The variables for 𝑳𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒊 and 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊 ideological identifications are
each coded as a dummy variable with a (0) indicating that the respondent does not align
with either the liberal or conservative ideology, and a (1) indicating that the respondent is
either slightly, moderately, or extremely aligned with either the conservative or liberal
ideology. The baseline for the ideology dummy variables is not identifying with either.
The second regression model considers the versions of the question asked and the above
demographic variables:
𝑨𝒊𝒅 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 +
𝜷𝟑 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑴𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓 𝑼𝒓𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔 𝑹𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒊 +
𝜷𝟕 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟎 𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏 𝑳𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
(2)
Attitudinal factors are also considered by the regression models.
𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊 , 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 , and 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒊 are all coded on the
same Likert scale of 1-5 with (1) indicating strongly disagree and (5) indicating strongly
agree. 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒔𝒊 , which measures how confident an individual is that they
can manage their financial debts, is also coded on a Likert scale with (1) indicating not at
all confident and (5) indicating extremely confident. 𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒆𝒅𝒈𝒐𝒗𝒕𝒊 , which asks
respondents if they trust the government to “do what is right,” has the following coding:
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(1) almost never, (2) some of the time, (3) most of the time, and (4) just about always.
𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 , or how often one attends religious services regardless of religion and
denomination, has the following coding: (1) never, (2) seldom, (3) a few times a year, (4)
once or twice a month, (5) once a week, and (6) more than once a week. The third
regression model accounts for versions of the experimental question received and the
above attitudinal variables, which are all expected to be positively associated with the
dependent variable:
𝑨𝒊𝒅 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 +
𝜷𝟑 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊 +
𝜷𝟓 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕 𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒆𝒅𝒈𝒐𝒗𝒕𝒊 +
𝜷𝟖 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒔𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
(3)
The final regression model used to control for individual-level factors that affect
support for economic/humanitarian aid is as follows:
𝑨𝒊𝒅 𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 +
𝜷𝟑 𝑵𝒐𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑴𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓 𝑼𝒓𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔 𝑹𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒊 +
𝜷𝟕 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟎 𝑳𝒊𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒍𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐 𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟑 𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌𝒂𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟒 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒑𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟓 𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒆𝒅𝒈𝒐𝒗𝒕𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟔 𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒈𝒊𝒐𝒔𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒔𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
(4)
Results
A distribution was run to determine the percentage of support for aid within the
sample for each version of the experimental question. The axis titles in Figure 2
correspond with the versions of the question displayed above in Figure 1. For each
category of aid, there is a similar fluctuation of support between the control and regimevariations. In fact, support is observed to be roughly equal between the control,
democratic versions, and democratizing versions, though it is slightly higher for
humanitarian aid as a whole. Interestingly, the democratizing versions, Version 3 and
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Version 7, have the highest percentage of support for both types of aid. There was a
10.24% increase in support from the control version for economic aid, between versions
1 and 3, and a 10.39% increase for humanitarian aid, between versions 5 and 7. On the
other hand, the non-democratic versions of the question are associated with decreased
support, and the democratic versions only moderately increase support by roughly 5%
from each control version. Though the non-democratic version of the question receives
the least support for both economic and humanitarian aid, support for the economic nondemocratic version, or Version 4, is 9.6% lower than support for the humanitarian nondemocratic version, or Version 8. Results from the distribution suggest that framing
matters. Americans believe consideration for humanitarian aid should not always be
considered in the context of regime. This could be due to a sense of a moral and human
obligation to help people in urgent need. To summarize, there is generally less support for
providing aid to a non-democratic country, this is more evident for economic aid than
humanitarian aid. Similarly, framing in the context of democratizing recipients illicits
marginally increased support.
Figure 2: Percentage of Respondents in Support of Aid vs Version Received
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The estimation results for the ordered logistic regression models are presented in
Tables 2 and 3. The first column in each table shows the estimate of the
benchmark/regime-only model in which neither demographic nor attitudinal variables are
controlled for. The remaining columns show the regressions in which the control
variables are added to the regression in accordance with the equation models specified in
the Data & Methodology section.
Table 2: Ordered Logistic Regression Results for Economic Aid
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Table 3: Ordered Logistic Regression Results for Humanitarian Aid

Overall, regression results tell a slightly different story from the distribution
results in Figure 2. Indicating that a non-democratic country is being considered for an
increase in economic aid makes respondents less likely to support the notion. However,
in terms of the comprehensive model, regime is not a significant determinant for
increasing humanitarian aid. The results still suggest that support for humanitarian aid is
50

not as sensitive to the context of regime. This may be the product of altruistic tendencies,
the belief that such aid is less likely to be abused by corrupt governments, and that
providing it to any type of regime is an acceptable risk. But now the results also suggest
that support for economic aid, or the lack thereof, is particularly sensitive to the
signalling of a non-democratic regime. This may be due to impressions of economic aid
as being discretionary and general perceptions of non-democratic regimes as being
corrupt. As corruption fatigue theory suggests, support for aid in the framing of this
context may be lower due to fears that economic aid has higher potential for misuse and
abuse by corrupt political elites. Although the results may be interpreted as to associate
perceptions of regime with corruption, it is important to note that non-democratic regimes
are not necessarily corrupt.
Furthermore, the regression results can be broken down even further to compare
which demographic and attitudinal factors are more significant in predicting support for
increasing economic verses humanitarian aid. However, the significant demographic and
attitudinal determinants for support are identical for both types of aid. Unsurprisingly,
residing in an urban area and identifying as a Democrat are associated with increased
support. On a similar note, conservative ideology is associated with less support for
increasing either economic or humanitarian aid. The latter finding can be intuitively
explained by the tendency for conservative individuals to be less favorable of aid in
general. Moreover, individuals who reside in urban areas tend to be more accepting of
diverse contacts and are Democratic; Democrats tend to be more liberal and thus more
favorable of foreign aid.
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Attitudinal determinants of support for economic and humanitarian aid are also
quite intuitive. The regression results suggest that the more interested in politics an
individual is, the more likely they are to support the notion of increasing either type of
aid. This may be due to a greater awareness of what each type of aid entails, where it is
delivered, and causes to which aid is allocated to. In line with theory that suggests
altruistic tendencies are positively correlated with support for foreign aid, trust in others
and religiosity are associated with higher levels of support for economic and
humanitarian aid. The regression results confirm Burcu’s (2017) findings on generalized
trust: the more an individual is inclined to trust others, which acts as a proxy for altruistic
tendencies, the more likely they are to support the distribution of foreign aid.
Furthermore, the results also confirm previous findings that the more religious an
individual is, which also serves as a proxy for altruism, the more likely they are to
support aid.
Nonetheless, the most significant conclusion from the similarity of the
demographic and attitudinal predictors between support for economic and humanitarian
aid is that it further confirms that support for aid is sensitive to the context of both type of
aid and regime of the recipient country ceteris paribus. This finding has substantial
implications for framing of foreign aid policy to policymakers, which will be further
discussed in the Conclusion section of this thesis.
Post-Estimation Results
To gain further insight into how the framing of the experimental question affected
responses I ran 16 marginal effects models. The marginal effects models more accurately
pinpoint the magnitude of the effects of the comprehensive regression model given by
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Equation 4 for both types of aid. The rows in the tables are the answer choices “no” and
“yes” and the columns indicate which version of the experimental question are being
used to predict the probability of each answer choice. All the values below can be
interpreted as the probability that each answer choice is predicted by Equation 4, based
on responses within the sample, for each version of the question. The marginal effects
models hold the other independent variables specified in Equation 4 at their mean. The
marginal effects model for economic aid is displayed in Table 4 and the model for
humanitarian aid is displayed in Table 5:
Table 4: Marginal Effects Model for Economic Aid
Control (V1)
No
Yes

.605
.395

Democracy
(V2)
.531
.469

Democratizing
(V3)
.511
.489

Non-democracy
(V4)
.723
.277

Table 5: Marginal Effects Model for Humanitarian Aid
Control (V5)
No
Yes

.611
.389

Democracy
(V6)
.560
.440

Democratizing
(V7)
.551
.449

Non-democracy
(V8)
.622
.378

The marginal effects results tell a similar story as the ordered logistic regression
results. The most noticeable difference in probabilities occurs in the non-democratic
version of the model for economic aid, which is 11.8% more likely to predict “no” than
the control (V1). This reaffirms the conclusion drawn from the regressions that support
for aid is sensitive to the context in which it is considered. More specifically, respondents
were more likely to answer “no” when the question was framed in terms of economic aid
and non-democratic regimes. The same reasoning can be deduced from the regression
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results that an impression of economic aid being discretionary in nature and perceptions,
albeit misconstrued, that non-democratic regimes are corrupt induce corruption fatigue.
Consequently, support for distributing further economic aid in this context decreases.
Also like the regression results, there is no significant difference between the
probabilities of the regression model predicting either answer choice for each regimecontext of humanitarian aid. Again, the reasoning behind this observation can be deduced
from the regression results that perceptions of humanitarian aid’s non-discretionary
nature and altruistic tendencies to help those in urgent need, rather than perceptions of
regime and corruption, drive public support in this context.
However, slightly different from the regression results is that the marginal effects
model for economic aid indicates that the democratizing version (V3) is also significantly
more likely to predict “yes” than the control version (V1) at 9.4%. It is also twice as
likely to predict “yes” than framing economic aid in the context of a non-democratic
regime (V4). This suggests that when all other demographic and attitudinal variables are
held constant, positive perceptions of democratizing regimes illicit greater support for
foreign aid. Nonetheless, post-estimation results also suggest that framing matters.
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UNITED STATES PUBLIC OPINION 2021: REGIME PRIORITIZATION BASED ON
TYPE OF AID
Data and Methodology
This section aims to determine how type of aid shapes which regimes the public
thinks are most deserving of aid. In the United States in June 2021, 625 individual
respondents were obtained using quota sampling for age, gender, and geographic region.
Descriptive statistics for the data and variables used are displayed in Table 6:
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics from Qualtrics June 2021 Public Opinion Survey
Variable

𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒎𝒆𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟐)𝒊
𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟑)𝒊
𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟒)𝒊
𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊
𝑭𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊
𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊
𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊
𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕
𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒊
𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒏𝒐𝒇𝒕𝒉𝒆𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒍𝒅𝒊
𝑼𝑺𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊
𝑰𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊
𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊

N

Mean

Standard Deviation

Min

Max

625

2.331

0.785

1

3

625
625

0.251
0.245

0.434
0.43

0
0

1
1

625
625

0.261
0.192

0.439
0.394

0
0

1
1

625
625

0.486
3.677

0.5
1.585

0
1

1
7

625
625

5.76
0.426

3.54
0.495

1
0

12
1

625
625

0.354
0.499

0.478
0.5

0
0

1
1

625
625

0.278
0.496

0.449
0.5

0
0

1
1

625

0.344

0.475

0

1

Within the survey, a four-version experimental design question was implemented
to gauge public opinion on this topic. Each respondent was randomly assigned one
version of the question, which varied by the type of aid being distributed—economic,
humanitarian, or military. For each version of the question, respondents could choose
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between “Democratic countries”, “Democratizing countries”, and “Non-democratic
countries.” The design of the experimental question is as follows in Figure 3:
Figure 3: Experimental Question Design from Qualtrics June 2021 Survey 9
Version 1: In your opinion, the U.S. should prioritize giving aid to what type of
countries?
Version 2: In your opinion, the U.S. should prioritize giving economic aid to what
type of countries?
Version 3: In your opinion, the U.S. should prioritize giving humanitarian aid to what
type of countries?
Version 4: In your opinion, the U.S. should prioritize giving military aid to what type
of countries?

Version 1 of the question serves as the control while the variations in types of aid
seen in versions 2, 3, and 4 serve as the experimental versions. To paint a full picture of
how the public thinks each type of aid should be distributed, four different ordered
logistic regression models are run.
The first model presented in Equation 5 only includes dummy variables for the
type of aid received in the question. The variables EconomicAid(V2)i,
HumanitarianAid(V3)i, and MilitaryAid(V4)i are coded (0) for the types of aid the
respondent did not receive in their version of the question and (1) for the type of aid
received in their version of the question. The dependent variable, RegimePrioritizationi,
indicates the respondents’ answer to the question as (1) non-democratic, (2)
democratizing, and (3) democratic.
𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒎𝒆𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟐)𝒊 +
𝜷𝟐 𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟑)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟒)𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
9

(5)

Highlighting and bolding are for emphasis in Figure 3 and are not in the original survey.
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I choose Regime Prioritization as the dependent variable for a couple of reasons.
The first is that previous studies have highlighted the significance of donor publics’
perceptions of corruption in recipient countries, or corruption fatigue, in decreasing the
public’s overall support for aid (Bauhr, Charron & Nasiritousi 2013; Diven &
Constantelos 2009). As a parallel to the phenomenon of corruption fatigue, I offer the
hypothesis that the type of aid discussed affects the type of regime publics in donor
countries would prefer to give aid to. Although previous literature suggests that
procedural democracies are most associated with high levels of corruption, this may not
be perceived accurately by the public. For instance, the public may think that nondemocracies are more corrupt than democratizing or democratic regimes. Consequently,
they may prefer to give aid to democratizing or democratic regimes. Responses to the
experimental question may provide insight as to how the public associates corruption
with the regime of recipient countries, and how that in turn affects aid.
The second model presented in Equation 6 adds demographic control variables to
the first ordered logistic regression model. Minorityi is a dummy variable coded as (0) to
indicate the respondent is white and (1) to indicate that the respondent is an ethnic
minority. Femalei is also a dummy variable coded as (0) to indicate the respondent is
male and (1) to indicate that the respondent is female. EducationLeveli is an ordinal
variable with the following coding to distinguish between different levels of education
among the respondents: (1) Less than high school, (2) High school graduate, (3) Some
college, (4) 2-year degree, (5) 4-year degree, (6) Professional degree, and (7) Doctorate.
HouseholdIncomeLeveli is also an ordinal variable that is coded into $10,000 quintiles
up through the last two income brackets. (1) indicates that the respondents’ household
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income is less than $10,000, (2) indicates $10,000-$19,999, (3) is $20,000-$29,999, (4) is
$30,000-$39,999, (5) is $40,000-$49,999, (6) is $50,000-$59,999, (7) is $60,000$69,999, (8) is $70,000-$79,999, (9) is $80,000-$89,999, (10) is $90,000-$99,999, (11) is
$100,000-$149,999, and (12) is more than $150,000. Finally, Democrati and Republicani
are two dummy variables to indicate that the respondent does not identify with either
party using a (0) and uses a (1) to indicate the respondent’s party identification as either a
Democrat or Republican.
𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒎𝒆𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟐)𝒊 +
𝜷𝟐 𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟑)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟒)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 +
𝜷𝟓 𝑭𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 +
𝜷𝟖 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
(6)
The third model (below in Equation 7) contains dummy variables to control for
attitudes towards international affairs. CitizenoftheWorldi is coded as a (0) to indicate
that the respondent does not see themselves as a “citizen of the world,” while a (1)
indicates that they do. Likewise, USInvolvementi is coded so that a (0) signifies that the
respondent does not think that “the U.S. should be more involved in international affairs”
while a (1) signifies that they do think so. Finally, ImmigrationSupporti indicates that the
respondent does not “support legal immigration” with a (0) and indicates that they do
with a (1).
𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒎𝒆𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒏𝒐𝒇𝒕𝒉𝒆𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒍𝒅𝒊 +
𝜷𝟐 𝑼𝑺𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑰𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊

(7)

Finally, the model presented in Equation 8 essentially combines all independent
variables regressed in Equations 5, 6, and 7. It serves as the primary theoretical model for
this thesis chapter.
𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒎𝒆𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟐)𝒊 +
𝜷𝟐 𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟑)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟒)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 +
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𝜷𝟓 𝑭𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 +
𝜷𝟖 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎 𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒏𝒐𝒇𝒕𝒉𝒆𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒍𝒅𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟏 𝑼𝑺𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐 𝑰𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
(8)
Results
A distribution was run for the sample to determine the percentage of support for
each type of regime based on the type of aid received by respondents. The axis titles in
Figure 4 correspond with the versions of the question laid out above in Table 2. Just from
these results, it is clear that the respondents would prefer to give aid to democratic
countries rather than democratizing and nondemocratic countries. There is not a
significant difference between preferences for democracies between the control,
economic aid, and humanitarian aid versions, which only vary by 48%, 53% (+5%) 10, and
52% (+4%), respectively. However, there appears to be a stronger aversion towards nondemocratic countries for economic aid at 16% (-10%), which in the control question was
26%. There is an even stronger preference for democratic countries when military aid is
mentioned, at 58% (+10%), and almost as strong of an aversion towards non-democratic
countries for military aid, at 17% (-9%), compared to economic aid. The results of the
distribution suggest that the American public is more inclined to prioritize aid for
countries like their own. For that reason, they may be even more hesitant to provide
economic and military aid to countries that are not democratic if they believe such aid
can be abused by governments they perceive to be “corrupt.”

10

Values in parentheses indicate differences, in terms of percentage, from the results of
the control version of this question.
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Figure 4: Overall Distribution of Responses

Overall Responses
16.56%

Version Received

Military

25.15%

20.26%

Humanitarian

51.63%

31.21%

52.87%

26.32%
25.66%

Control
0.00%

28.10%

15.92%

Economic

58.28%

10.00%

20.00%

Non-democratic

48.03%

30.00%

Democratizing

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

Democratic

The estimated results for the regression models are presented in Table 7. The
columns in the table correspond to the regression models detailed in Equations 5, 6, 7,
and 8 in the Data and Methodology section of this chapter.
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Table 7: Regime Prioritization Regression Results

It is apparent from the regression results that the public does not seem to
differentiate aid in general from economic or humanitarian aid. However, the estimated
coefficient for military aid remains positive and grows in significance throughout each
model. Thus, the data suggests that military assistance elicits greater support for aid to
democratic countries as opposed to less democratic countries. The democratic preference
for military aid may imply that the public prioritizes giving military aid to countries that
they perceive to be like their own: substantive democracies.
Two demographic variables impact an individual’s perception of where aid should
be distributed. The more educated an individual is, the higher their tendency is to support
democratizing or non-democratic countries as opposed to democratic countries. One
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factor that may contribute to this result is that people who are more educated are more
likely to be informed on foreign policy topics, including foreign aid. Thus, they may be
more informed on the intent of foreign aid to help developing countries—which tend to
be non-substantive democracies, democratizing, or non-democratic (Hariss-White &
White 1996)— rather than developed, democratic countries.
More surprisingly, though, the coefficient for those who identify as Republicans
is statistically significant and negative, suggesting that Republicans are more likely to
prioritize distributing aid to democratizing or non-democratic countries. The reason this
pattern occurs may not be intuitive, but it may suggest that Republicans prioritize giving
foreign aid to countries for reasons other than a regime’s institutions or corruption-related
factors. Examples of other motives include creating new export markets, securing
strongholds in developing regions, or believing aid will lead to gradual regime change.
On the other hand, this estimate may just be an anomaly11.
The only attitudinal variable that is statistically significant at the level of p<.05 is
support for legal immigration. Those who support legal immigration are more likely to
support providing aid to democratizing and non-democratic countries. Although one
would expect the estimate of the coefficient for support of legal immigration to be

11

To confirm that the results were not drastically distorted by omitted variable bias I
estimated the third model of the ordered regressions, but excluded the variable for
Democratic party identification, or Democrati. Interestingly, the estimate for the
Republicani coefficient moved from 𝜷= -0.544 with a p-value of .016 to 𝜷= -0.377 with
a p-value of .028. Within the latter estimate, the coefficients for the other independent
variables did not significantly change. This may suggest that the model is not accounting
for a certain attribute of Republicans, but between these particular ordered logistic
regression models, neither did the direction nor the level of significance for the
Republican variable change. Consequently, the implications of the Republican variable
estimate in the original model are muddied.
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correlated with partisan divisions, a cross-tabulation of the variable according to party
identification suggests otherwise: 54.3% of Republicans, but only 51.1% of Democrats,
said they supported legal immigration. Regardless, the impact of legal immigration may
be an indication that those who support it are more sympathetic towards residents of
countries that generate immigrants, which tend to be democratizing and non-democratic
countries. If this is the explanation for the observed results, it would also confirm that
altruism plays a significant role in determining the public’s opinion of where foreign aid
should be distributed.
Proxy for Aid Favorability
The main models have operated under the assumption that foreign aid must be
distributed to a recipient country with no regard to whether foreign aid, in the general
sense, is actually favored by the public or not. Due to the international norm that
developed countries should donate at least .7% of their GNP, in combination with the fact
that the average aid donation of developed countries is only .3% of their GNPs while the
U.S. only donates .2% of their GNP (Ingram 2019), it is reasonable to assume that the
U.S. foreign aid budget is not going to be eliminated or significantly decreased in the
near future.
However, to account for the shortfall in the original model, I run a fourth ordered
logistic regression. The model adds 𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊 to the theoretical regression
equation (Equation 8). It is a dummy variable used to indicate that the respondent does
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not support foreign aid with a (1) and that the respondent is either indifferent towards or
supportive of foreign aid with a (0)12.
𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒎𝒆𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟐)𝒊 +
𝜷𝟐 𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟑)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟒)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 +
𝜷𝟓 𝑭𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 +
𝜷𝟖 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎 𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒏𝒐𝒇𝒕𝒉𝒆𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒍𝒅𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟏 𝑼𝑺𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐 𝑰𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟑 𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊 +
𝜺𝒊
(9)
The results for the Aid Support Proxy specification that includes the variable
𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊 are presented in Table 8:

12

The data for the 𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊 variable comes from another experimental foreign aid
question within the same Qualtrics survey. The four variations of this other experimental
question were randomly assigned to the respondents, with each question receiving
approximately the same number of responses. The control version of the question reads:
“The U.S. federal budget for fiscal year 2021 allocates $40 billion to foreign aid. Should
foreign aid be decreased, stay about the same, or increased?” The variations of this
control question are as follows:
 Version 2: “The U.S. federal budget for fiscal year 2021 allocates $40 billion to
foreign aid, most of which goes to peace and security, health, and humanitarian
assistance. Should foreign aid be decreased, stay about the same, or increased?”
 Version 3: “The U.S. federal budget for fiscal year 2021 allocates $40 billion to
foreign aid. This constitutes approximately 1 percent of the federal budget. Should
foreign aid be decreased, stay about the same, or increased?”
 Version 4: “The U.S. federal budget for fiscal year 2021 allocates $40 billion to
foreign aid, most of which goes to peace and security, health, and humanitarian
assistance. This constitutes approximately 1 percent of the federal budget. Should
foreign aid be decreased, stay about the same, or increased?”
The answer choices available to the respondents were consistent throughout each
version: aid should be “decreased,” “stay about the same,” or “increased.” For the
𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊 variable used in the fourth ordered logistic regression model, the
respondents who responded “decreased,” regardless of the version of this question
received, were coded as a (1). Responses of “stay about the same” and “increased” were
coded as (0).
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Table 8: Aid Support Proxy Regression Results

The results from this model indicate that the variable intended to capture the
effects of aversion to foreign aid has a very small impact and is not significant at the
p<.05 level. The coefficients for the independent variables from the third regression
model have not considerably changed, and the variables that demonstrated to have a
statistically significant impact on the dependent variable hold the same level of
significance in the fourth model. Overall, the results suggest that the public’s general
support for foreign aid does not significantly impact their opinion on which types of
countries should receive foreign aid.
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Interaction Variable Models
The main models have also operated under the assumption that the independent
variables do not interact with each other to influence individuals’ support for foreign aid.
To test for interactions between independent variables, 9 additional ordered logistic
regression models were created. Each control variable— 𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 , 𝑭𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊 ,
𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊, 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊, 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕 and 𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒊 ,
𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒏𝒐𝒇𝒕𝒉𝒆𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒍𝒅𝒊 , 𝑼𝑺𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊 , 𝑰𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 , and
𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊 —were multiplied by each version of aid and added to the original and
aid proxy models. The general regression model for the first eight interaction terms is as
follows:
𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒎𝒆𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟐)𝒊 +
𝜷𝟐 𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟑)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟒)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 +
𝜷𝟓 𝑭𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 +
𝜷𝟖 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎 𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒏𝒐𝒇𝒕𝒉𝒆𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒍𝒅𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟏 𝑼𝑺𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐 𝑰𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟑 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 ∗ 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟒 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 ∗
𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟓 𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆 ∗ 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊 (10)
The regression model for 𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊 is as follows:
𝑹𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒎𝒆𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟐)𝒊 +
𝜷𝟐 𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟑)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟑 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚𝑨𝒊𝒅(𝑽𝟒)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑴𝒊𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 +
𝜷𝟓 𝑭𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕 𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 +
𝜷𝟖 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎 𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒏𝒐𝒇𝒕𝒉𝒆𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒍𝒅𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟏 𝑼𝑺𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐 𝑰𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟑 𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟒 𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝑨𝒊𝒅 ∗ 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟓 𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝑨𝒊𝒅 ∗
𝑯𝒖𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟔 𝑫𝒆𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆𝑨𝒊𝒅 ∗ 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚𝑨𝒊𝒅𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
(11)
The only interaction model to report statistically significant results was
𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒏𝒐𝒇𝒕𝒉𝒆𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒍𝒅𝒊 . This model will be discussed in length in this section while the
rest of the models can be viewed in the Appendix of this thesis. The results table
modeling the interaction variables for 𝑪𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒏𝒐𝒇𝒕𝒉𝒆𝑾𝒐𝒓𝒍𝒅𝒊 is as follows in Table 9:
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Table 9: Citizen of the World Interaction Regression Results

The results indicate that the interaction term between those who identify as a
“citizen of the world” and the variable for humanitarian aid have a statistically significant
effect on regime prioritization, tending towards democracies, at the p<.05 level. This
differs from the original citizen of the world variable, as seen in both Table 9 and Table
7, which was negative and not significant at the p<.05 level. In other words, identifying
as a citizen of the world is associated with a higher propensity to prioritize giving
humanitarian aid to more democratic countries. This is a surprising development
considering that the citizen of the world variable generated a negative coefficient estimate
in the original theoretical model. This may suggest that identifying as a world citizen is
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associated with altruistic tendencies surrounding the idea of providing humanitarian aid,
as well as democratic sentiments that shape the idea of being a citizen of the world.
Perhaps there are democratic elements of world citizenship, or the “world” is confined,
consciously or not, to democratic countries. Nonetheless, the altruistic tendencies that
compel individuals to assist their community may also advance their disposition to
provide humanitarian aid to democratic countries.
Interestingly, the variable for the military aid version of the question is no longer
significant at the p<.05 level. This suggests that accounting for the interaction between
the signaling of humanitarian aid and being a citizen of the world has a more significant
effect on regime prioritization than the signaling of military aid alone as in the previous
models. Further investigation into the relationship between identifying as a citizen of the
world and humanitarian aid may provide more insight as to why this is the case, but that
discussion is outside of the scope of this paper.
Post-Estimation Results
Marginal effects models were run to more accurately pinpoint the magnitude of
the specifications identified in the third regression model (Equation 3). The columns in
Table 4 indicate which version of the experimental question is being analyzed for the
marginal effects specification. The rows in the table are the answer choices for the
experimental question that were specified in the Data & Methods section of this paper.
The cells contain the probability that each answer choice is predicted by Equation 3 for
each version of the question while simultaneously holding the other independent
variables in the model at their means. Thus, a total of 12 marginal effects models were
estimated:
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Table 10: Marginal Effects Model for Regression Equation 8

Control (V1)

Economic Aid
(V2)

Humanitarian
Aid (V3)

Military Aid
(V4)

Non-democratic

0.240

0.184

0.188

0.146

Democratizing

0.313

0.285

0.287

0.255

Democratic

0.448

0.532

0.525

0.599

The results from Table 10 illustrate a similar story as the results from Table 7 but
also provides further insight on the framing of the experimental question and each of its
variations, thus containing significant policy framing implications that will be discussed
in the Conclusion section of this thesis. The probability that the control (V1) version of
the question would predict prioritizing aid for democracies, based on the respondents’
answers, is not drastically different from the probabilities of predicting democracies in
the economic (V2) and humanitarian (V3) aid questions. In fact, the probabilities that the
regression model would predict prioritizing aid to democratizing or non-democratic
countries did not vary considerably between the control (V1) version and the economic
(V2) and humanitarian (V3) aid versions.
However, the probability that the model would predict prioritizing aid to
democracies jumps from .448 in the control (V1) version of the question to .599 in the
military aid (V4) version. Conversely, the probability that the model would predict aid
should be prioritized to non-democratic countries decreases by almost .1 from the control
(V1) version to the military aid (V4) version of the question. This suggests that the
framing of the question increases a respondent’s propensity to prioritize military aid to
democratic countries as opposed to democratizing or non-democratic countries.
There are two plausible explanations for this finding. One is that respondents,
who may be inclined to prioritize aid to countries like their own, may have a flawed
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perception of what characterizes “democratic” regimes. They may think that military aid
should go to fully consolidated, or substantive, democracies that have institutional
characteristics similar to the United States (i.e. the United Kingdom or France), perhaps
relating to the concept of corruption fatigue; the public does not want military aid to be
distributed to a “corrupt” country where 1) there is low government efficiency, or 2) the
aid has potential to be abused. However, countries that have democracies that are not
fully consolidated, or are procedural, are still democracies in the technical sense. Public
perceptions of corruption in procedural democracies may be higher due to differences in
how the public views corruption in such democracies as opposed to how they view it in
substantive democracies. Consequently, they equate the former as being either
“democratizing” or “non-democratic” in the context of this survey.
The second explanation is that the public has a flawed perception of what military
aid constitutes. According to USAID, military aid is not just limited to “assistance to
foreign governments’ armed forces for purposes such as internal security [and] legitimate
self-defense,” but also includes assistance with peace and diplomatic efforts (U.S.
Agency for International Development 2021). There may be a tendency to associate
military aid as just consisting of the former, arguably broader and more sensitive,
component, which ultimately reinforces the propensity to provide military aid to
democracies similar to the U.S. Despite the premises that the public may base their
opinion of military aid on, the results are still politically significant. Public opinion is
considered for policymaking in democratic donor countries, including in foreign aid
policy (Mosley 1985). However, there is a larger irony here: many consolidated, stable
democracies already possess a greater ability to provide for their own defense.
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SOUTH KOREA PUBLIC OPINION 2020: EFFECTS OF POLICY INFORMATION
ON SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN AID TO NORTH KOREA
Data and Methodology
This analysis relies on data from a survey distributed in South Korea by
Macromill Embrain in September 2020, which obtained 1201 respondents. Summary
statistics for this data can be viewed in Table 11 below:
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics from Macromill Embrain September 2020 Public
Opinion Survey
Variable

Observations

Mean

𝑨𝒊𝒅𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍(𝑽𝟏)𝒊
𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝑨𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕(𝑽𝟐)𝒊
𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝑨𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕%(𝑽𝟑)𝒊
𝑭𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊
𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊
𝑴𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉𝒍𝒚𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊
𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚
𝑼𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒅𝑭𝒖𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚𝒊
𝑱𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚𝒊
𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝑶𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊
𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊
𝑼𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊
𝑵𝒖𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒊
𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒊

1201
1201
1201
1201
1201
1200
1200
1200
1200
1201
1201
1201
1200
1200
1200
1200
1200

.2456
.3322
.3339
.3331
.4938
3.7367
4.8642
.3817
.1950
.4505
.1232
.0674
1.5092
2.2842
3.1742
3.7367
6.0308

Standard
Deviation
.4306
.4712
.4718
.4715
.5002
1.1015
2.0589
.4860
.3964
.4977
.3288
.2509
.7508
.8986
1.1860
.9236
2.2743

Min

Max

0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
6
9
1
1
1
1
1
3
5
5
5
10

Within the survey, an experimental question asking respondents’ opinion of
increasing aid to North Korea, with varying information about costs of aid, was asked:
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Figure 5: Experimental Question Design from Macromill Embrain September 2020
Public Opinion
Version 1: Do you think South Korea should give more humanitarian aid to
North Korea than they are giving now?
Version 2: South Korea has allocated approximately $5.7 million (680 billion
won) for humanitarian aid to North Korea for 2020. Do you think South Korea
should give more humanitarian aid to North Korea than they are giving now?
Version 3: South Korea has approximately $5.7 million (680 billion won) for
humanitarian aid to North Korea for 2020. This comprises less than one-tenth of
one percent of the national budget. Do you think South Korea should give more
humanitarian aid to North Korea than they are giving now?
Respondents could either respond “no” or “yes” to one of the three versions of the
question that were equally distributed among them. Respondents’ answer to this question
serves to gauge support for distributing humanitarian aid to North Korea, which is the
dependent variable for this study. The survey also asks respondents a variety of
demographic and attitudinal questions that are useful for examining predictors of public
opinion on providing aid to North Korea. To analyze the effect of framing foreign aid
policy in this manner, I ran 4 ordered logistic regression models. The hypothesis for this
analysis is that, compared to the control version of the question, support for providing
humanitarian aid will decrease when respondents are only provided with the dollar
amount of aid allocated to North Korea, but will increase when respondents are also
provided with the percentage of the national budget equivalent to the dollar amount.
The first model in Equation 12 serves as a benchmark model and only considers
the version of the experimental question asked, or in other words, how policy information
was framed to respondents. 𝑨𝒊𝒅𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 is coded as a dummy variable with a (0)
indicating “no” and a (1) indicating “yes.” 𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝑨𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕(𝑽𝟐)𝒊 and

72

𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝑨𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕%(𝑽𝟑)𝒊 are dummy variables coded with a (0) to indicate that the
respondent did not receive that version of the experimental question and with a (1) to
indicate that the respondent received either version. Thus, the control version of the
question, or version 1, serves as the baseline for regression analysis of the experimental
survey question.
𝑨𝒊𝒅𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝑨𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕(𝑽𝟐)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝑨𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕%(𝑽𝟑)𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
(12)
The second model presented in Equation 13 incorporates demographic and
identity factors. 𝑭𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊 is coded into a dummy variable, with a (0) indicating a male
and (1) indicating a female. Similarly, the variables 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 ,
𝑼𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒅𝑭𝒖𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚𝒊 , and 𝑱𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚𝒊 are dummy variables for South Korean
political parties, indicating the respondents’ party identification with a (1) and lack
thereof with a (0). 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 is a categorical variable with the coding: (1) under
high school, (2) high school graduated, (3) attending college, (4) college graduated, (5)
graduate school without completion, and (6) completed graduate school.
𝑴𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉𝒍𝒚𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 is coded into quintiles. The variables for
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊 and 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊 ideologies are dummy variables coded with a (0)
to indicate that the respondent does not align with either the liberal or the conservative
ideology, and a (1) to indicate that the respondent is either slightly, moderately, or
extremely aligned with either the conservative or liberal ideology. The baseline for both
ideology dummy variables is identifying as ideologically moderate.
𝑨𝒊𝒅𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝑨𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕(𝑽𝟐)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝑨𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕%(𝑽𝟑)𝒊 +
𝜷𝟑 𝑭𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 +
𝜷𝟓 𝑴𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉𝒍𝒚𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊 +
𝜷𝟕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑼𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒅𝑭𝒖𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟎 𝑱𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
(13)
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The third regression model presented in Equation 14 controls for attitudes
associated with perceptions of the north and of foreign aid more generally. The
𝑵𝒖𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒊 and 𝑼𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 variables, which ask respondents to
rate their concern for North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and whether they support
unification, are coded on a likert scale of (1) “strongly disagree” and (5) “strongly agree.”
To measure generalized trust (Burcu 2017), respondents were asked “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing
with people?” Responses are provided by the 𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝑶𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊 variable, an ordinal
variable coded to signal progressively higher levels of trust, thus following the coding of
(1) “Can’t be too careful,” (2) “It depends,” and (3) “Most people can be trusted.”
𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒊 asked respondents to rate how concerned they were that North
Korea would use military force against South Korea on a scale of (1), indicating “not
concerned at all,” to (10), indicating “very concerned.” The variable
𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊 gauges respondents’ perceptions of relations between North Korea
and South Korea with the following coding: (1) Very negative, (2) Negative, (3) Neither
negative nor positive, (4) Positive, and (5) Very positive.
𝑨𝒊𝒅𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝑨𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕(𝑽𝟐)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝑨𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕%(𝑽𝟑)𝒊 +
𝜷𝟑 𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝑶𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓 𝑼𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 +
𝜷𝟔 𝑵𝒖𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒊 + 𝜷𝟕 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
(14)
The final model, below in Equation 15, combines all independent variables
included in the regression models presented in Equations 12, 13, and 14. Thus, Equation
15 serves as the primary theoretical models for this chapter of the thesis.
𝑨𝒊𝒅𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 = 𝜷𝟏 𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝑨𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕(𝑽𝟐)𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑫𝒐𝒍𝒍𝒂𝒓𝑨𝒎𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕%(𝑽𝟑)𝒊 +
𝜷𝟑 𝑭𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒊 + 𝜷𝟒 𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 +
𝜷𝟓 𝑴𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒉𝒍𝒚𝑯𝒐𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒉𝒐𝒍𝒅𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍𝒊 + 𝜷𝟔 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒈𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊 +
𝜷𝟕 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊 + 𝜷𝟖 𝑫𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒄𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒄𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚 + 𝜷𝟗 𝑼𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒆𝒅𝑭𝒖𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒆𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚𝒊 +
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𝜷𝟏𝟎 𝑱𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒆𝑷𝒂𝒓𝒕𝒚𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟏 𝑻𝒓𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒏𝑶𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐 𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑹𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟑 𝑼𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑺𝒖𝒑𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒊 + 𝜷𝟏𝟒 𝑵𝒖𝒄𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒓𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒊 +
𝜷𝟏𝟓 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒓𝒚𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
(15)
Results
First, I ran a distribution of “yes” responses to determine what percentage of
respondents supported increasing humanitarian aid based on the version of the question
they received. It is important to note that South Korea only provides humanitarian aid due
to multilateral sanctions placed on North Korea. Thus, analysis of the experimental
question only focuses on public support for providing humanitarian aid to North Korea
and how framing the context with varying amounts of information affect that support.
The results are displayed below in Figure 6:
Figure 6: Distribution of Responses Support for Humanitarian Aid to North Korea

% in Support vs Version Received
28.00%
27.00%

26.82%

26.00%
25.00%

24.25%

24.00%
22.69%

23.00%
22.00%
21.00%
20.00%
Control

Dollar amount

Dollar amount and %

Without receiving any information about aid allocation, only 26.8% of
respondents supported giving more aid to North Korea. When only receiving the
information that South Korea allocated $5.7 million (670 billion won) to humanitarian for
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North Korea, support decreases to 22.69%. When additionally receiving the information
that the dollar amount comprises less than one-tenth of one percent of the national
budget, support slightly increased to 24.25%. From the sample statistics, it is evident that
the information received in the second and third versions of the experimental question
were associated with only slightly differing levels of support for aid. This may be the
case because other factors play a larger role in determining support, especially
considering $5.7 million won is not a lot of money in a government spending context
The results for the ordered logistic regression models can be viewed below in
Table 12:
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Table 12: Ordered Logistic Regression Results

The ordered logistic regressions indicate that support for aid to North Korea is not
sensitive to policy framing surrounding allocative costs 13. This outcome reflects the
results from the distribution of responses in Figure 6, which also found that there are not
significant differences between providing the dollar amount or providing the dollar
amount and budget-percentage. These findings suggest that public support for aid is

13

Because the ordered logistic regression did not yield significant results for the question
version variables I did not run marginal effects models, for the insignificance of these
variables have made such post-estimation models moot.
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driven by other factors more than policy framing or lack of information regarding the
allocation of aid to North Korea.
A few demographic factors influence an individual’s support for providing further
humanitarian aid to North Korea. Despite previous findings that women are more likely
to support foreign aid than men, the regression estimates indicate that women are
significantly less likely to support aid to North Korea. While the rationale for this
occurrence is unclear, it may be attributed to unobserved cultural and political dynamics
that are particular to South Korea. Unsurprisingly, possessing a progressive ideology
makes an individual more likely to support providing further aid to the north, which
echoes previous findings that individuals with left-leaning views are more likely to
support foreign aid in general. Following the same logic, identifying as a member of
either the Democratic or Justice parties also predispose individuals to be more supportive
of distributing aid to North Korea. This result was expected considering that the Justice
Party is the most left-leaning party in South Korea and that the Democratic Party is
center-left.
The most interesting findings are offered by the attitudinal variables that predict
support. The variables with highly significant coefficient estimates pertain to perceptions
of North Korea and inter-Korean relations. Increasingly positive views toward current
relations with North Korea and increasing levels of support for unification are associated
with growing support for providing North Korea with more humanitarian aid. This also
suggests negative views toward inter-Korean relations, perhaps due to North Korean
belligerence or perceptions of its corruption, are associated with decreased support for
providing aid. The positive correlation between evaluations of relations and support for
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aid is consistent with previous findings that suggest support is contingent upon
perceptions of North Korea as either a threat, resulting in decreased support, or
perceptions of it as a bretheren nation. Likewise, support for unification may be closely
tied to attitudes toward North Korea, as well as with the potential that such aid has to
overcome developmental challenges posed by the north should unification occur. More
simply, those who are more supportive of unification may view humanitarian aid as an
investment towards unification. On the other hand, concerns that North Korea poses a
military threat to South Korea is negatively correlated with support for aid. Again, this
finding is consistent with previous literature that has established the relationship between
perceptions of security threats posed by North Korea and a decline in support for giving it
aid. Overall, the regression results suggest that policy framing surrounding information
about allocative costs does not significantly influence support for providing humanitarian
aid to North Korea. However, policy framing surrounding relations with North Korea
might. The implications of this finding will be addressed in the Conclusion section of this
thesis.14

14

Although not included in this paper, I also generated interaction variables between each
of the demographic and attitudinal variables with each version of the question and ran
additional ordered logistic regression models to test for significant interaction terms. For
each regression, I included all of the variables modeled in Equation 15 with the addition
of the chosen independent variable interacted with the dummy variable for the second
version of the experimental question and the same chosen independent variable interacted
with the dummy variable for the third version of the question. However, none of the
models produced significant results. This suggests that the comprehensive model
presented in Equation 15 is sufficient as-is.
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CONCLUSION
Summary
To recap the quantitative findings of this thesis, three public opinion surveys were
conducted to examine the effects of policy framing and perceptions of recipient countries
on public support for aid in democratic donor countries, particularly the United States and
South Korea. Although several broad conclusions can be drawn from the findings of the
public opinion surveys, I will first summarize the main findings of each survey’s
analysis.
First, the Amazon mTurk survey conducted in the U.S. in June 2020 examined the
effects of framing regarding type of aid and type of reciepient regime. Through ordered
logistic regression and marginal effects analysis, I found that in the context of economic
aid signalling that the recipient country is non-democratic has a negative, significant
effect on public support for distributing aid. This finding may be the product of
perceptions, however misconstrued, that economic aid is discretionary in nature and that
non-democratic regimes, associated with higher levels of corruption, may abuse or
misuse the aid. On the other hand, type of recipient regime has no significant effect on
support for humanitarian aid, perhaps due to altruistic tendencies and a moral obligation
to provide aid to those in need. The marginal effects results also indicate that perceptions
of democratizing regimes, compared to non-democratic regimes, illicit positive
perceptions that make Americans twice as likely to support giving economic aid.
Interestingly, there was no difference in the demographic and attitudinal predictors of aid
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support between the two types of aid. This consistency further confirms that public
support for foreign aid is sensitive to policy framing.
Second, the Qualtrics survey conducted in the U.S. in June 2021 examined the
effects of policy framing regarding type of aid on where the public thinks aid should go,
or regime prioritization. Through ordered logistic regression and marginal effects
analysis, I found that in the context of military aid the public prefers to give aid to
democratic countries over less-democratic ones. Like the conclusion drawn about
economic aid in the June 2020 survey, this may be due to perceptions, albeit not accurate,
of military aid as potentially arming non-democratic, or corrupt, regimes that may abuse
or misuse the aid. An additional robustness check, which examined the effects of general
support for aid on regime prioritization, found that the latter is not affected by the former.
This may suggest that policy framing intended to influence the types of regimes the
public supports aid going to can have a significant effect on support regardless of the
public’s attitude towards aid in general.
Finally, the survey conducted by Macromill Embrain in September 2020
examined the effects of policy framing regarding information about allocative costs on
South Korean support for providing aid to North Korea. Interestingly, according to
ordered logistic regression analysis, providing any information about costs does not have
a significant effect on support. Beyond expected factors that may predict an individual’s
support for providing aid to North Korea, namely possessing a progressive ideology,
certain attitudes towards the north have highly significant impacts. Increasingly positive
attitudes towards North Korea, particularly perceptions of relations between the north and
the south and support for unification, are associated with increased support for aid.
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Contrastingly, increasingly negative attitudes toward North Korea, or concerns that North
Korea poses a military threat, are associated with decreased support for providing it with
humanitarian aid. These findings are consistent with previous literature that suggest
support for providing aid to North Korea is contingent upon perceptions of the country.
More specifically, support for aid declines following the country’s belligerent actions.
Conclusions from Cross-National Comparison and Directions for Future Research
A few overarching conclusions can be made about public opinion in democratic
countries through comparison of the main findings. Perhaps most obviously, public
support for aid and preferences to whom it should go are influenced by policy framing
surrounding type of aid and perceptions of recipient countries or regimes. Future surveys
could consider how interactions between different types of policy framing, including
informative context, interact to influence support for aid or regime prioritization. Another
comparison that can be made between the surveys is that progressive individuals are
consistently inclined to be more supportive of foreign aid. Due to a lack of resources and
the different types of relationships I examined, I did not control for the same attitudes
across each survey. Thus, I cannot draw a general conclusion about the attitudes held by
individuals in democratic donor countries that would predispose them to favor aid. More
importantly, and for the same reasons, I cannot draw a broadly applicable conclusion
concerning which methods of policy framing are most effective on publics in democratic
donor countries. However, it may be safe to infer that the most effective methods of
policy framing are dependent upon the context in which aid is being considered.
Examples of different contexts include political attitudes dependent on social and cultural
factors of donor countries, specific recipient countries, and international events.
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Although my rationales on perceptions of recipient regimes are based on literature
regarding corruption fatigue (Bauhr et. al 2013) and literature establishing a correlation
between regime and corruption, how the public perceives corruption and its association
with regime is not clear from the data because the relationship is never explicitly drawn.
Future surveys could enhance the robustness of my conclusions by implementing
questions that gauge respondents’ associations between type of regime and perceptions of
corruption. Even further, surveys could combine elements of dichotomous and openended questions that would link this association directly to attitudes toward foreign aid.
Policy Implications
The findings from my thesis have significant implications for the realm of foreign
aid policy. Overall, it is evident that policy framing has a significant effect on public
support for aid and regime prioritization. However, framing methods that have significant
effects on public attitudes toward foreign aid may differ between countries and social and
political contexts. Thus, I will address policy implications in-depth for the United States
and for South Korean aid to North Korea.
For the United States, President Biden intends to bring foreign aid back to the
forefront of U.S. foreign policy, which heavily contrasts from President Trump’s
“America First” approach to foreign policy (Whitehouse.gov 2021; Kull 2017). From
what the administration has outlined in its Discretionary Request for fiscal year 2022,
military aid will primarily be distributed to democratizing and non-democratic regimes to
counter authoritarian threats, particularly those posed by Russian and Chinese influence
in the developing world. Additionally, aid will be directed towards Central America to
curb endemic corruption, and to the Middle East for peace and security purposes
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regarding the Israel and Palestine conflict (Office of Management & Budget 2021). Thus,
foreign assistance efforts proposed by the Biden administration are likely to be met with
public opposition. However, there are a few ways in which the oval office can frame
foreign aid policy to increase public support for these initiatives.
The first, and most important, manner in which the administration should frame
their policy is by explicitly connecting the issues they are attempting to alleviate abroad
with domestic issues such as domestic security. By appealing to the majority of
Americans’ preference for addressing domestic over international issues, the public may
be more forgiving about the types of countries the military aid is going to. This outcome
can also be achieved by downplaying the costs of these aid efforts considering the public
prefers domestic over international spending. By discussing the costs of military aid in
the context of the foreign aid budget, and then in the context of the federal budget more
generally, the public may realize that the administration’s plans for aid are relatively lowcost. Another way that the administration can acquire more public support is by framing
policy in a manner that emphasizes the heavy, on-ground involvement of military aid.
This strategy appeals to how Americans are more supportive of foreign aid when it is
stated in a mission-specific manner while simultaneously countering decreased support
caused by perceptions of corruption in any of the recipient countries. Generally, the
administration should be more informative of their intentions with foreign aid, and define
different types of aid, to dispel the widespread notion that foreign aid is ineffective.
For South Korea, these findings have significant implications for engagement
with North Korea. The factors identified in this paper can help policymakers in the
Ministry of Unification frame aid policy in terms that would increase public support for
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giving humanitarian aid to the north. More specifically, instead of emphasizing the
budget allocated for aid, they should go this intiative by framing current relations with
the north in a positive light. They should also emphasize themes of reunification,
overcoming developmental challenges posed by North Korea if reunification was to
occur, and outcomes of Korean prosperity. This strategy entails that security threats
posed by North Korea need to be downplayed to 1) address possible corruption fatigue,
and 2) make themes of unification and prosperity seem more attainable. However, this is
easier said than done, especially considering the recent hike in North Korean weapons
testing, the low-issue salience of engagement with North Korea, and even lower salience
of providing it with bilateral aid.
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